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Abstract: The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person dis-
counted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known
own payo®s. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the un-
informed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payo®s is
essentially the same as that in the undiscounted case. This implies that even
small amounts of incomplete information can lead to a discontinuous change
in the equilibrium payo® set. For the case of equal discount factors, however,
and under an assumption that strictly individually rational payo®s exist, a
result akin to the Folk Theorem holds when a complete information game is
perturbed by a small amount of incomplete information.
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¤ The current version is based on a paper entitled \The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games of Incomplete
Information" presented at the 1996 summer workshop at MEDS Northwestern University, and the 1995
Fields Institute Conference Toronto.1 Introduction
In this paper we consider discounted non-zero-sum repeated games between two players
with one-sided incomplete information and known own payo®s. We shall investigate equi-
librium payo®s as the players become patient. We consider two cases concerning relative
discount factors. Our ¯rst main result, in Section 3, states that for arbitrary given initial
beliefs, for a ¯xed value of the uninformed player's (player 2) discount factor, and if the
informed player's (player 1) discount factor is su±ciently close to one, the equilibrium
payo®s to player 1 (for each of a ¯nite number of types) must approximately satisfy the
conditions of a \fully revealing" equilibrium|one in which the informed player acts to
reveal her information at the start of the game. In such an equilibrium, the play (prob-
ability distribution over paths) induced by the strategy of each type of player 1 against
player 2's strategy must yield individually rational payo®s to player 2.1 This is potentially
a much stronger restriction on the set of equilibria than the condition that average play|
averaging across player 1's types using player 2's prior beliefs|should satisfy individual
rationality. This latter condition must hold in any equilibrium, and it also (trivially) holds
in the complete information game between a particular type k a n dp l a y e r2 ,w h e r e ,c o m -
bined with the condition that play must be individually rational for type k of player 1, is
essentially the only restriction on equilibrium play (by the Folk Theorem). Depending on
the game, the former type-by-type condition can imply major restrictions on equilibrium
payo®s of an incomplete information game relative to the corresponding (for each type)
complete information game.
The restriction that play in a state where player 1 is type k0 satisfy the individual
rationality constraint, can imply that some type k, who always has the option to mimic
type k0; can guarantee herself a payo® higher than her lowest feasible individually rational
payo® (any equilibrium must satisfy the condition that no type prefers to mimic another
type). This ¯rst result implies a continuity result2 with the undiscounted case: holding
prior beliefs constant, as the players' discount factors go to one, if player 1's discount
factor goes to one su±ciently fast relative to that of player 2, then the limiting set of
1The precise statement of this requires the use of player 1's discount factor in the evaluation of player
2's payo®s.
2This continuity property is not uniform with respect to initial beliefs.
1equilibrium payo®s for player 1 must satisfy the necessary conditions appropriate for the
model with no discounting, because the latter has equilibrium payo® equivalence to fully
revealing equilibria (Shalev (1994); see Section 3 for a precise statement). This contrasts
with the Folk theorem applied to the complete information game involving type k.3
In Section 4, the symmetric discounting case is analysed. Under an assumption
on the existence of strictly individually rational payo®s, we establish a continuity result
with complete information games as the probability of one of the types goes to one: for
any degree of approximation, provided the players are su±ciently patient and provided
initial beliefs put su±ciently high probability on this type, then given any feasible strictly
individually rational payo® vector in the game between this type and player 2, there is a
Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game with approximately these payo®s
(to this type of player 1 and to player 2). Since there is no such continuity result for
undiscounted games as the size of the perturbation goes to zero, it can be concluded that
the equilibrium characterization which exists for the undiscounted case is only the limit
(as discount factors go to one, holding beliefs constant) of the discounted case if the limit
is taken in a particular way, and notably it is not the limit of the discounted case if both
players' discount factors are equal.
Very roughly, the di®erence between the two cases can be explained as follows. If
the uninformed player is very patient relative to the informed, then the period of learning
of the uninformed player will be unimportant in the calculation of the informed player's
payo®s; from the point of view of the latter it is as if information is revealed early on
in play and the equilibrium must approximately satisfy conditions of a fully revealing
equilibrium. If the two players are equally patient, however, the period of learning can
a l w a y sb eu s e d ,i fn e c e s s a r y ,t od r i v et h ep a y o ®o fo n eo ft h et y p e so ft h ei n f o r m e d
player down towards her individually rational payo®, while rewarding player 2 to avoid
his individual rationality constraint from binding. (When there is no discounting, again,
the period of learning has no e®ect on payo®s.)
The situation where one or more players' preferences may be unknown to the oppo-
3See, e.g., Forges (1992) for an example and precise statement of how perturbing an undiscounted
complete information game by introducing a small probability of an alternative type of one of the players
can lead to a large reduction in the set of payo®s that player can receive in equilibrium. A similar example
is developed below in Section 4.
2nent(s) has received relatively little attention in the non-zero-sum discounted repeated
games literature, despite considerable work on `reputation' models where perturbations
of preferences are in terms of irrational or commitment types. Undiscounted repeated
games of incomplete information with known-own payo®s have, however, been studied in
some depth (see Section 3). Some recent results exist for the discounted case, however.
Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and Jordan (1995) have established that play, in a given state,
must converge to Nash play of the complete information game played between the realised
types in that state. Jordan (1995) has also proved the existence of an equilibrium for this
class of games. Perfect Bayesian equilibria of such games must have a Markov property
(Bergin (1989)). The results of Kalai and Lehrer and Jordan on convergence to Nash
play are informative about the long-run behaviour of an equilibrium, but to be able to
say anything about the overall payo®s from the beginning of the game|what we are in-
terested in here|it is necessary to know something about how rapidly convergence takes
place relative to the rate of discounting of payo®s and also, possibly, what happens in the
shorter run. By exploiting a result due to Fudenberg and Levine (1992) on the speed of
learning (see also Sorin (1999) for a synthesis of a number of the results in this literature)
the case where the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player
can be completely solved purely on the basis of \long-run" considerations. A more de-
tailed consideration of the shorter run is needed for the symmetric discounting case as the
speed of learning is crucial.4 Finally, in a recent paper, equilibrium payo®s in discounted
repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information have been studied by Lehrer and
Yariv (1999), who show that as both players become in¯nitely and equally patient the
equilibrium payo®s converge to those with no discounting, whereas if the informed player
is in¯nitely more patient than the uninformed an example is given to show that this is
not true.
4This contrast is why the characterization for the case of a relatively patient informed player holds
for all priors which assign positive probability to all types: equilibria are shown to be approximately
equivalent in terms of player 1's payo®s to an equilibrium where information is revealed at the start of
play; prior beliefs are unimportant for such equilibria. In the symmetric discounting case, where the speed
of learning matters, priors play an important role and they determine the characterization of equilibrium
payo®s. In this case we only provide a characterization for priors putting almost all weight on a particular
type.
32T h e M o d e l
The in¯nitely repeated game ¡(p;± 1;± 2) is de¯ned as follows. There are two players
called \1" (she) and \2" (he). At the start of the game, player 1's \type" k is drawn
from a ¯nite set K (where K also denotes the number of elements) according to the
probability distribution p =( pk)k2K 2 ¢K (the unit simplex of <K), and informed to
player 1. Hence pk will denote the prior probability of type k. We shall assume that each
type has strictly positive probability: pk > 0f o ra l lk. In every period t =0 ;1;2;:::,
player 1 selects an \action" it out of a ¯nite action space I, while player 2 simultaneously
chooses an action jt from the ¯nite set J,w h e r eI and J have at least two elements.
Payo®s at stage t to type k of player 1 and to player 2 are respectivelyAk(it;jt)a n d
B(it;jt). Player i discounts payo®s with discount factor ±i 2 (0;1), with the payo® to
type k of player 1 being ~ ak =( 1 ¡ ±1)
P1
t=0 ±t
1Ak(it;jt), and that to player 2 being
~ b =( 1 ¡ ±2)
P1
t=0 ±t
2B(it;jt). Both players observe the realized action pro¯le (it;jt)
after each period. Let Ht =( I £ J)t+1 be the set of all possible histories ht up to
and including period t. A (behavioral) strategy for type k of player 1 is a sequence
of maps ¾k =( ¾0
k;¾1
k;¢¢¢), ¾t
k : Ht¡1 ! ¢I. We de¯ne ¾ =( ¾k)k2K. Likewise, a
strategy for player 2 is a sequence of maps ¿ =( ¿0;¿1;¢¢¢), ¿t : Ht¡1 ! ¢J. The prior
probability distribution p, together with a pair of strategies (¾;¿), will induce a probability
distribution over in¯nite histories and hence over discounted payo®s. We use Ep;¾;¿ to
denote expectations with respect to this distribution, and abbreviate to E where there is
no ambiguity. Players are assumed to maximize expected payo®s, and a Nash equilibrium
is de¯ned as a pair of strategies (¾;¿) such that, for each k, Ep;¾;¿ [~ ak j k] ¸ Ep;¾0;¿ [~ ak j k]
for all ¾0,a n dEp;¾;¿[~ b] ¸ Ep;¾;¿0[~ b] for all ¿0. Finally we shall need the following. Let
^ ak := ming2¢J maxf2¢I Ak(f;g)b et y p ek' sm i n m a xp a y o ® ,w h e r ew eu s et h en o t a t i o n a l
abuse that Ak(f;g) is the expected value of Ak(i;j) when mixed actions f and g are
followed. Likewise player 2's minmax payo® is given by ^ b := minf2¢I maxg2¢J B(f;g).
3 A Relatively Patient Informed Player
We start by considering the case where the discount factor of player 2 is taken as ¯xed,
and we let the discount factor of player 1, the informed player, go to one. This case
4corresponds closely to the undiscounted case; necessary conditions which must be satis¯ed
by player 1's payo®s in the undiscounted case must also be (asymptotically) satis¯ed in
the discounted case as ±1 ! 1. These necessary conditions can be interpreted as requiring
payo® equivalence to some fully revealing equilibrium.
Hart (1985) gave a complete characterization for the general class of undiscounted
games (payo®s evaluated according to a Banach limit) with one-sided incomplete infor-
mation, which includes the possibility that the uninformed player is unaware of his own
payo® function. For the case we are interested in, namely \known own payo®s" but where
one of the players does not know the payo®s of the other player, a simpler characteriza-
tion has been provided by Shalev (1994) (see also Koren (1988), and Forges (1992) for a
survey of the literature.) Denote this game by ¡(p;1;1). In Theorem 1 we shall show that
essentially the same characterization as that of Shalev can be obtained for the discounted
case provided the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player.
We de¯ne ¯rst individual rationality in this setting. Punishment strategies for player
2 are more complex than in the complete information setting, because all possible types
of player 1 must simultaneously be punished. Let x := (xk)k2K 2< K be a vector of
payo®s for the types of player 1. For q 2 ¢K,l e ta(q) be player 1's minmax payo® in the
one-shot game with payo®s given by
P
k2K qkAk(i;j).The set of payo®s fy 2< Kjy · xg
is said to be approachable b yp l a y e r2i fa n do n l yi f
q ¢ x ¸ a(q) for all q 2 ¢
K: (1)
Blackwell's approachability result (Blackwell (1956)) then implies that player 2 has a
strategy, ¿, that guarantees type k gets average (i.e., undiscounted) payo®s of no more
than xk whatever strategy, ¾, player 1 uses. Thus if the set fyjy · xg is approachable
then x is a vector of feasible punishment payo®s for player 2 to impose on the types of
player 1. We will say that the vector x =( xk)k2K is individually rational (IR) if the
set fyjy · xg is approachable. For player 2 the de¯nition of individual rationality is the
usual one from complete information repeated games: a payo® y for player 2 is individually
rational if
y ¸ ^ b: (2)
Let ¼ =( ¼ij)i;j 2 ¢I£J be a joint distribution over I £ J (i.e., a correlated strategy).
5This will generate a vector of payo®s for player 1 and a payo® for player 2 of Ak(¼)=
P
i2I;j2J ¼ijAk(i;j)a n dB(¼)=
P
i2I;j2J ¼ijB(i;j) respectively. Let ¦ = (¢IJ)K be the
set of all correlated strategy pro¯les for each type, (¼k)k2K.T h e n
De¯nition 1 De¯ne ¦0 ½ ¦ to be the subset of pro¯les satisfying conditions (i) (in-
dividual rationality): (Ak(¼k))k2K is individually rational for player 1, and B(¼k) is
individually rational for player 2 for each k 2 K,a n d(ii) (incentive compatibility):
Ak(¼k) ¸ Ak(¼k0) for all k;k0 2 K.
Shalev (1994) showed that payo®s (a;b) are Nash equilibrium payo®s of ¡(p;1;1) if and
only if there exists a pro¯le of correlated strategies (¼k)k2K 2 ¦0 such that Ak(¼k)=ak
for all k 2 K and
P
k2K pkB(¼k)=b. In other words equilibria are payo® equivalent to
equilibria in which player 1 acts to reveal the true state at the start of the game. This
requires that B(¼k) is individually rational for player 2 for each k 2 K; as once player 2
is aware of the state, play, as summarised by ¼k; must yield player 2 at least his minmax
payo® otherwise he could pro¯tably deviate.
We are now in a position to state Theorem 1 | that Shalev's equilibrium character-
ization holds approximately as a necessary condition provided that player 1 is su±ciently
patient relative to player 2. This theorem is a characterization of the equilibrium pay-
o®s of player 1 only: since di®erent discount factors are being used, the usual feasibility
constraint on the average payo® pro¯le across both players does not apply. First we need
to de¯ne the set of payo® vectors which player 1 can receive in equilibrium in the undis-
counted case (i.e., the projection of the equilibrium payo® set onto the space of player 1's
payo®s). We de¯ne
A
¤ = f(A1(¼1);A 2(¼2);:::;A K(¼K)) : (¼k)k2K 2 ¦0g : (3)
We can state
Theorem 1 Let ±2, 0 <± 2 < 1,a n dp À 0 be ¯xed. Then for any ²>0 there exists a
±1 < 1 such that for all 1 >± 1 >± 1,i fp l a y e r1h a se q u i l i b r i u mp a y o ® sa in ¡(p;± 1;± 2),
then
minx2A¤ k a ¡ x k<²: (4)
6The ¯rst ancillary result used to establish this is Lemma 2, which states that equi-
librium play between type k a n dp l a y e r2 ,a ss u m m a r i s e di nt h ea v e r a g e( u s i n gp l a y e r1 ' s
discount factor in the weighted average) frequencies over action pro¯les, must approxi-
mately satisfy the individual rationality condition of De¯nition 1 for player 2.I t sp r o o f
depends on two main ideas. First (Lemma 1), if player 2's equilibrium strategy gives
him less than ^ b when he plays against k, then he must anticipate that the probability
distribution over outcomes if he is facing type k's strategy di®ers from the one generated
by the \expected" equilibrium strategy of player 1 (averaging over all possible types using
player 2's beliefs). Furthermore, because player 2 discounts future payo®s, there must be
a signi¯cant di®erence between these distributions in the not too distant future. The sec-
ond idea (Result 1) states that if player 1 follows type k's strategy, then player 2 cannot
continue to believe that the true probability distribution over outcomes is signi¯cantly
di®erent from the one generated by type k's strategy. Taken together, these results imply
that if player 1 plays according to type k's strategy, then player 2 cannot continue to
respond with a strategy which gives him less than ^ b against this strategy. Eventually he
will learn that his opponent is playing type k's strategy, and he will choose a response
which gives him at least his minmax payo®. For a ¯xed value of ±2, Result 1 implies an
upper bound on how long this learning takes. Consequently if a su±ciently high discount
factor (i.e., ±1 as opposed to ±2) is used to evaluate player 2's payo®s, this learning phase
will be insigni¯cant and player 2 must get approximately his minmax payo® against type
k.
For a ¯xed equilibrium of ¡(p;± 1;± 2), we de¯ne the average frequencies over action
pro¯les conditional on type k using discount factor ± as: ¼
ij
k (±)=( 1 ¡±)E [
P1
t=0 ±t1fi;j;tgjk];
for each i and j,w h e r e1fi;j;tg is the indicator function for the action pro¯le (i;j)o c c u r -
ring at date t. It is easy to check that the equilibrium payo®s are E [~ ak j k]=Ak(¼k(±1))






k2K pkB(¼k(±2)). Let bmin =m i n i2I minj2J B(i;j)b et h ew o r s t
payo® player 2 can get in the stage game. Consider after any history ht the set of pos-




. For given equilibrium strategies (¾;¿)w el e tqN(¢jht)b e
the distribution over these outcomes (i.e., qN(yN j ht)= p r o b [ ht+N =( ht;y N) j ht]; using
obvious notation; it is de¯ned for ht having positive probability) and likewise qN(¢jht;k)
the distribution conditional additionally upon player 1's true type being k (de¯ned for
7ht having positive probability conditional on type k). We de¯ne for any two distribu-
tions qN and ^ qN, k qN ¡ ^ qN k := maxyN
¯ ¯ ¯qN(yN) ¡ ^ qN(yN)
¯ ¯ ¯. Finally, de¯ne the
continuation payo® for player 1 type k, discounted to period t +1 ,a s : ~ a
t+1










Lemma 1 Let ±2 2 (0;1) and ²>0 be given and consider any Nash equilibrium and
any history ht which has positive probability in this equilibrium conditional upon type k.








· ^ b ¡ ²: (5)






t;k) k >´ : (6)
Proof: Straightforward.
The next result shows that if player 1 follows the strategy of type k, then there can
be only a ¯nite number of periods in which the probability distribution over outcomes
predicted by player 2 di®ers signi¯cantly from the true distribution. Eventually, player
2 will predict future play (almost) correctly. Given integers N and n,w i t hN>0a n d
0 · n<N, de¯ne the set T(n;N)=fn;n+N;n+2N;:::g. The result is a straightforward
adaptation of the main theorem of Fudenberg and Levine (1992, Theorem 4.1) which is
stated for the case N =1 .
Result 1 (Fudenberg and Levine) Given integers N and n,w i t hN>0 and 0 · n<
N, and for every »>0, Ã>0 a n dat y p ek of player 1 with pk > 0, there is an m
depending only on N, », Ã,a n dpk such that for any (¾;¿) the probability, conditional on





t;k) k >Ã (7)
is less than ».
8Lemma 2 states that equilibrium play between type k and player 2, as summarised
in the average (using player 1's discount factor in the weighted average) frequencies over
action pro¯les, must approximately satisfy the individual rationality condition of De¯ni-
tion 1 f o rp l a y e r2(see Cripps et al. (1996) for a related argument in the `reputation'
context).
Lemma 2 Given ±2 < 1 and for any Á>0,t h e r ee x i s t sa±1 < 1 such that whenever
±1 <± 1 < 1, the average frequencies over action pro¯les for each k 2 K in any Nash
equilibrium, calculated using discount factor ±1, ¼k(±1), satisfy
B(¼k(±1)) ¸ ^ b ¡ Á: (8)
Proof: Fix an equilibrium and a type k and choose ² = Á=3 in Lemma 1; then there
is an N and an ´ such that (6) holds whenever (5) holds. Set Ã = ´ in Result 1, take
any integer n,0· n<N ,a n ds e t» =
Á
3N(^ b¡bmin) (assuming that ^ b>b min;t h el e m m a
is trivial otherwise). Then by Result 1 there is an m (¯nite) such that the probability
that inequality (6) holds more than m times in T(n;N)i sl e s st h a n», so the probability
that inequality (5) holds more than m times in T(n;N)m u s ta l s ob el e s st h a n». Hence,
considering all values for n,0· n<N , we have that the probability, conditional upon







· ^ b ¡ Á=3 (9)
holds more than Nm t i m e si ss m a l l e rt h a nN» =
Á
3(^ b¡bmin).N e x t , E
h





(1 ¡ ±2)B(it+1;jt+1)+±2~ bt+2 j k
i
; so (1¡±2)E [B(it+1;jt+1) j k]=E
h
~ bt+1 ¡ ±2~ bt+2 j k
i
:
Hence, player 2's payo® against type k in the equilibrium, calculated using player 1's dis-
count factor, is













































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯k
#)
: (10)











1¡±1 (^ b ¡
Á
3) ¡ (±1 ¡ ±2)(^ b ¡ bmin)Nm
o
with probabil-
ity at least (1 ¡ N») conditional on k, where we are using the fact that in the event that
9(9) fails no more than Nmtimes, subtracting (^ b¡bmin) Nmtimes undiscounted yields a
payo® lower than the minimum possible. The random variable is at least ±1¡±2
1¡±1 bmin other-
wise. Using this in (10) gives a lower bound, say ­(±1;± 2), so that B(¼k(±1)) ¸ ­(±1;± 2),
and notice that ­(±1;± 2) is independent of the particular equilibrium studied. Next, tak-






+ N»bmin ; hence,
since N» =
Á
3(^ b¡bmin),w eg e t
lim





3(^ b ¡ bmin)
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9(^ b ¡ bmin)






1 such that ­(±1;± 2)i sw i t h i n
Á
3 of its limit (±
(k)
1 depends only upon pk, Á
and ±2), we have for ±1 ¸ ±
(k)
1 ;B (¼k(±1)) ¸ ^ b ¡ Á: Set ±1 =m a x k2Kf±
(k)
1 g and the result
follows. Q.E.D.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: We take ±2 and p to be ¯xed throughout the proof. First con-
sider condition (i) of De¯nition 1 of ¦0, individual rationality (for player 1). Let (¾;¿)
be a Nash equilibrium pair of strategies for the game ¡(p;± 1;± 2), and suppose that the
equilibrium payo® pro¯le for player 1, a =( Ak(¼k(±1)))k2K, is not individually rational.
Then by (1), there exists q¤ 2 ¢K such that q¤ ¢ a <a (q¤). By the minimax theorem,
q








so that if player 1 plays a mixed action f¤ which attains the maximum in (12), q¤ ¢ a <
P
k q¤
kAk(f¤;g) for all g 2 ¢J.D e n o t e b y ¾¤ the repeated game strategy in which
player 1 plays the mixed action f¤ each period and independently of type k.T h e n





























¤ ¢ a ; (13)
since given that ¾¤ does not vary with type, conditioning on k does not a®ect the distri-
bution over histories. Because q¤ 2 ¢K, it follows that Ep;¾¤;¿ [~ ak j k] >a k for at least
10one k, contradicting the de¯nition of equilibrium. Hence individual rationality must be
s a t i s ¯ e df o rp l a y e r1f o ra n yv a l u eo f±1;t h a ti s ,a satis¯es (1). Next, condition (ii) of
De¯nition 1 (incentive compatibility) must be satis¯ed for any ±1,0<± 1 < 1, since in any
Nash equilibrium Ak(¼k(±1)) ¸ Ak(¼0
k(±1)) for all k, k0 by the de¯nition of equilibrium
(recall that Ak(¼k(±1)) is the equilibrium payo® of type k of player 1, and Ak(¼0
k(±1)) is
the payo® type k would get from following the strategy of type k0).
Finally, individual rationality for player 2 must be dealt with. De¯ne
^ ¦: =f(¼k)k2K 2 ¦ j Ak(¼k) ¸ Ak(¼k0)a l l k;k
0;(Ak(¼k))k2K is individually rationalg ;
and de¯ne the compact valued correspondence ª : [0;1) !! ¦b y
ª(Á)=
n
(¼k)k2K j B(¼k) ¸ ^ b ¡ Á for all k 2 K
o
:
Since ª is an upper hemi-continuous function of Á, it follows that the correspondence given
by ª \ ^ ¦, which is non-empty (Shalev (1994)), is also upper hemi-continuous. Moreover,
if the linear function A((¼k)k2K): =( A1(¼1);A 2(¼2);:::;A K(¼K)) is de¯ned on ¦, the
correspondence given by A[ª(Á) \ ^ ¦] is an upper hemi-continuous function of Á,w i t h
value A¤ at Á = 0. Hence given ²,t h e r ei sa¹ Á>0 such that for 0 · Á<¹ Á, all payo®s in
A[ª(Á) \ ^ ¦] lie within ² of A¤.C h o o s eÁ i nL e m m a1t ob e¹ Á; the corresponding ±1 is
therefore as required for (4) to hold. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 developed necessary conditions which equilibrium payo®s must satisfy asymp-
totically. In the undiscounted model, the condition that play must correspond to a point
in ¦0 is necessary and su±cient for equilibrium (Shalev (1994)). Theorem 1 established
that in the discounted game it is necessary that equilibrium play (averaged using ±1)
approximately satisfy the same condition when player 1 is su±ciently patient. A partial
converse is provided by the following, where it is assumed that the inequalities in the
conditions of De¯nition 1 are assumed to hold strictly. We say that a payo® vector a is
strictly individually rational for player 1 if there exists some individually rational point x
with ak >x k for all k.
Theorem 2 Suppose that (¼k)k2K 2 ¦0 satis¯es (i) : (Ak(¼k))k2K is strictly individually
rational for player 1, and B(¼k) is strictly individually rational for player 2 for each
11k 2 K,a n d(ii) : Ak(¼k) >A k(¼k0) for all k;k0 2 K. Then for any ²>0 there exists a
± such that whenever 1 >± 1, ±2 >± , there exists a Nash equilibrium of ¡(p;± 1;± 2) with
payo®s (a;b) satisfying jAk(¼k) ¡ akj <²for all k 2 K and j
P
k2K pkB(¼k) ¡ bj <² .
The proof is straightforward and is omitted; it follows closely the argument for the undis-
counted case given in Koren (1988) which constructs a completely revealing joint plan,
with each type k revealing itself during the ¯rst few periods and thereafter playing ap-
proximately according to ¼k. One complication which arises is the punishment of player
1; see Section 4 for a discussion of Blackwell punishment strategies with discounting.
4 Symmetric Discounting
In this section we consider games where the two players are equally patient. We denote
this class of games by ¡(p;±), so ¡(p;±): =¡ ( p;±;±). We show that the (Nash) Folk
Theorem for complete information games is robust to small perturbations in the informa-
tion structure; speci¯cally it can be extended to the repeated games ¡(p;±)w h e np1 is
close to one. In the previous section, by contrast, the characterization was valid for all
values of p. (For symmetric discounting, it is easy to construct examples in which the
Folk Theorem characterization fails when p1 is not close to one.) In the repeated game
of complete information played between, say, type 1 of player 1 and player 2, which we
denote by ©1(±); the Folk Theorem asserts that, given any pro¯le of feasible and strictly
individually rational payo®s (a1;b), there is a Nash equilibrium where the players receive
these payo®s if the players are su±ciently patient. We will extend this result in the fol-
lowing way. Again let (a1;b) be any pro¯le of feasible and strictly individually rational
payo®s for the complete information game played by type 1 and player 2. Then Theorem
3 shows, given an assumption on the existence of strictly individually rational payo®s,
that there exists ±º;p º
1 < 1 such that the pair (a1;b) can be approximately sustained as
equilibrium payo®s in ¡(p;±)i f±>± º and p1 >p º
1. Thus introducing a small amount of
uncertainty about the type of player 1 does not reduce the set of equilibrium payo®s in
any signi¯cant way when both of the players are su±ciently, and equally, patient.
The de¯nition of individual rationality given in Section 3.1 applies to player 1's
undiscounted payo®s. In discounted games as the players become more patient, player 2
12is able to approximate these punishments arbitrarily closely. First we de¯ne the notion
of ²-IR payo®s.
De¯nition 2 Let ²>0 be given. The vector x =( xk)k2K 2< K is ²-individually rational
(²-IR) if the set f y 2< K j y + ²1 · x g is approachable.
(The notation 1 is used to denote a K¡ dimensional vector of 1's.) There is a lower
threshold on the discounting, ±²,s ot h a ti f±>± ² then player 2 can hold player 1 down
any ²-IR payo® in ¡(p;±). Let Cav a(p) be the (pointwise) smallest concave function
g(p) satisfying g(p) ¸ a(p)w h e r ea(p)i sd e ¯ n e di n( 1 ) .T h e nC a va(p) is the value for
the zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information with no discounting that is played
when player 2's payo®s are (¡Ak(i;j))k2K (e.g., Zamir (1992, p.126)). Now consider
the zero-sum discounted repeated game of incomplete information with the same payo®s.
The value function for this game, v±(p), exists and satis¯es 0 · v±(p) ¡ Cav a(p) ·
M
q
f(K ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ±)=(1 + ±)g (see Zamir (1992, pp.119-125)). This implies that as ± ! 1
the punishments that can be imposed in the discounted game converge uniformly to the
punishments that can be imposed in the undiscounted game (details of this ¯nal step
available on request).
The Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games of complete information, as usually
stated, applies only to strictly individually rational payo®s. Likewise, we shall assume (in
(A.1)) that we can ¯nd strictly (by a margin of at least ¹ ²) individually rational payo®s
for the repeated game of incomplete information ¡(p;±).
(A.1) There exists (¸ ¼1; ¸ ¼2;:::;¸ ¼K) 2 (¢IJ)K and ¹ ²>0 such that (Ak(¸ ¼k))k2K
is ¹ ²-IR and B(¸ ¼k) > ^ b +¹ ² for all k 2 K.
We de¯ne strict individual rationality by a strict inequality and approachability,
rather than in relation to the players' minmax levels. As in the complete information
case there are always weakly individually rational payo®s, that is, there exists (¸ ¼k)k2K 2
(¢IJ)K and an individually rational vector (¸ !k)k2K so that: Ak(¸ ¼k) ¸ ¸ !k, B(¸ ¼k) ¸ ^ b, for
all k 2 K, but A.1 requires more. In particular, it implies that the game of complete
information played between each type k and player 2 has strictly individually rational
13payo®s and thus it cannot be the case, for example, that one of player 1's types plays
a zero-sum game with player 2. It is, nevertheless, a natural extension of the implicit
restriction made in the complete information case.
It is now possible to state the main result of this section. G1(0) denotes the set
of feasible, individually rational payo®s in ©1(±); i.e., G1(0) := f(A1(¼);B(¼))jA1(¼) ¸
^ a1;B(¼) ¸ ^ b;¼ 2 ¢IJg:
Theorem 3 Assume A.1 and let º>0 be given. Then there exists ±º < 1, pº
1 < 1 such
that for all p with p1 >p º
1 and for all ±>± º,g i v e na n y(a1;b) 2 G1(0) the game ¡(p;±)
has an equilibrium with the payo®s ((®1;:::;®K);¯) 2< K+1 which satisfy
k(®1;¯) ¡ (a1;b)k <º : (14)
4.0.1 Example
As an illustration, we consider an example, where 2 >c¸ 1 (which satis¯es (A.1)

























3) imply that for c<2; there is a lower bound on type 1's equilibrium payo® in the
undiscounted case strictly above her minmax payo® of 3=4 (see Forges (1992; Proposition
8.3), for a general statement of this result); individual rationality for type 2 and for player
2( A2(¼2) ¸ 1;B(¼2) ¸ 3=4), together with incentive compatibility, implies A1(¼1) ¸
A1(¼2) ¸ 3(c +2 ) =4(3c ¡ 2): (This is clearest for the case where c =1 ; since A2(¼2) ¸ 1
then implies ¼2(T;L)+¼2(T;R)=1a n d¼2(T;L) ¸ 3=4; so that A1(¼1) ¸ 9=4). Here we
14show in the symmetric discounting case that as ± ! 1; type 1's equilibrium payo® can be
driven down to 3=4, provided p1 ¸ 3=4:
Let ²>0 be given. In what follows, type 2 of player 1 will play T on all equilibrium
paths. Consider ¯rst the following (pooling) equilibrium of ¡(p;±): both types of player
1p l a yT and player 2 plays L in every period, irrespective of past history. Player 1 gets
(3;c) and player 2 gets a payo® of 1 (this plays the role of the equilibrium of Lemma 5).
This will be our \terminal equilibrium". Next, precede this equilibrium by the repeated
play of (T;R)b yb o t ht y p e sa n db yp l a y e r2( ( T;R)i sp l a y e dt or e d u c et y p e1 ' sp a y o ®
and in general will need to be replaced by a ¯nite sequence). Punishments in all earlier
periods involve player 2 being minmaxed thereafter forobservable deviations, and type 1
being minmaxed for observable deviations by player 1 (so type 2 gets (3 + c)=4 after any
observable deviation); in the general proof we shall need to vary the punishment with
type 1's payo®. The constraint that limits the length of the phase where (T;R)i sp l a y e d
in such a pooling equilibrium concerns player 2's individual rationality. Thus (T;R)i s
played out N times before the above terminal equilibrium is played, where N is the largest
integer satisfying (1¡±N)0+±N1 ¸ (1¡±)3+±3=4 (the LHS is player 2's payo® from the
strategy speci¯ed, and he can get at most 1 in the period of deviation and is minmaxed
thereafter). When ± is close to 1;± N is close to 3=4; so player 2's payo® is also close to
3=4:t h e r ee x i s t s±¤(²) < 1s u c ht h a tf o r±>± ¤(²), player 2's payo® ±N is within ²=3o f
3=4; 5 and thus type 1's payo® ±N3i sn om o r et h a n² above 9=4: Payo®s to type 1 and
player 2 at this (pooling) equilibrium are shown by point C in Figure 1.
To reduce type 1's payo® further, we introduce a randomization by type 1 in the
¯rst period of this equilibrium: suppose that type 1 plays B with probability q such that
p1q =0 :5 (assuming for the moment that p1 > 0:5), where p1 is player 2's prior at the
s t a r to ft h ep e r i o d( s ot h a tf r o mp l a y e r2 ' sp o i n to fv i e wB is played with probability
0:5). If B is played, so that player 1 signals she is type 1; then from the start of the
following period an equilibrium of the complete information game is played in which, to
ensure type 1's indi®erence, the payo® to type 1, say x; satis¯es (1 ¡ ±)1 + ±x = ±N3;
5The continuation payo® received by player 2 at any date can change between consecutive dates by
at most 2M(1 ¡ ±) <² = 6f o r±>1 ¡ ²=12M =1¡ ²=36; likewise the RHS of the inequality de¯ning N
given above is within ²=6o f3 =4i f±>1 ¡ 9
24²; on the other hand ±N cannot be below 3=4 or else 2's
constraint would be violated. Consequently for ±>± ¤(²): =1¡ ²=36;± N 2 [3=4;3=4+²=3]:
15D
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Figure 1: Payo®s to type 1 and player 2
and player 2 gets 4 ¡ x (on the frontier of feasible set). Consequently payo®s at this
equilibrium to type 1 and player 2 are (3±N;(±N +(1¡±)3+±(4¡x))=2) = (3±N;2¡±N);
after substitution for x: The purpose of the randomization is to increase the payo® that
player 2 receives so as to relax his incentive compatibility constraint, thus allowing further
plays of (T;R): The equilibrium just described (see point D in the ¯gure) now replaces
the initially described pooling equilibrium in a repetition of the argument. N0 rounds of
(T;R) are added at the start until again player 2's individual rationality constraint binds:
(1 ¡ ±N0)0 + ±N0(2 ¡ ±N) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)3 + ±3=4: Repeating the argument given earlier, for
±>± ¤(²);± N0
(2 ¡ ±N)i sw i t h i n²=3o f3 =4: Again add an initial randomization of say
q0 of playing B b yt y p e1s ot h a tp0
1q0 =0 :5, where p0
1 is player 2's prior at the start
of the period, and an equilibrium of the complete information game played by type 1
and player 2, which we denote ©1(±); with payo®s (y;4 ¡ y) to follow. Payo®s are then
(3±N+N0;(±N0(2 ¡ ±N)+( 1¡ ±)3 + ±(4 ¡ y))=2) = (3±N+N0;2 ¡ 2±N+N0 + ±N0); which for
²<e ² for some e ²>0a n d±>± ¤(²), lie above the 45o line being su±ciently close to
16(27=20;17=10).6 A further repetition of the argument, so that more plays of (T;R)a r e
appended at the beginning, then implies that the payo® of type 1 will reach 3=4b e f o r e
that of player 2 does, so that the latter constraint no longer prevents type 1 receiving
a low payo®. By choosing ²<e ² small enough, type 1 can be held as close to 3/4 as
desired provided ±>± ¤(²). Observable deviations cannot be optimal as all continuation
payo®s are above punishment levels: this is clear for type 1 and for player 2; type 2
gets a continuation payo® of (1 ¡ ±n)1 + ±nc where there are n p e r i o d st og ob e f o r e
the ¯nal pooling equilibrium, and ±n ¸ 1=4 by type 1's individual rationality; whereas
deviation yields at most ±(3 + c)=4. We also need to check that type 2 cannot bene¯t
from playing the sequence of actions associated with type 1 revealing her type; type 2's
payo® is (1 ¡ ±N00
)1 + ±N00
c ' (3 + c)=4w h e r e N00 is the total number of periods to go
before the ¯nal pooling equilibrium, and ±N00
' 3=4: Along any of the three paths that
are played in equilibrium, let ® be the discounted frequency of (T;L);¯of (B;R)a n d
(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)o f( T;R): For type 1 to be indi®erent among them, 3® + ¯ must equal a
constant, say C (' 3=4); while type 2 gets 1 + ®(c ¡ 1) ¡ ¯; which is maximised, given
type 1's indi®erence condition, by ® = C=3;¯=0 ; which corresponds to the equilibrium
path of type 2 (while mimicking revelation by type 1 has ¯>0). So mimicking cannot
be pro¯table. As there were two randomizations (at each of which the total probability of
player 1 revealing herself to be type 1 is 1=2), the strategies above are an equilibrium of
¡(p;±)p r o v i d e dp1 ¸ 3=4: To obtain higher payo®s to type 1; it is only necessary to stop
the above process earlier; to obtain arbitrary payo®s to player 2, we append an initial
randomization by type 1, as described earlier, but in which the equilibrium of ©1(±)g i v e s
player 2 close to the desired payo®s. Provided type 1's probability is su±ciently close to
1, this will provide any desired degree of approximation.
In the generalisation of the example which follows, we shall split the above con-
struction into three steps, ¯rst ignoring type k = 2 and constructing the equilibrium as
an equilibrium of a complete information game, before introducing the possibility of a
second type. Finally we deal with more than two types.
6Speci¯cally, given that ±N 2 [3=4;3=4+²=3]; and ±N0
¢ (2 ¡ ±N) · 3=4+ ²=3; it follows that ±N0
·
3=5+3 2 ²=5(15 ¡ 4²) ´ 3=5+¢ : Thus type 1's payo® ±N+N0
¢ 3 · 3(3=4+²=3)(3=5+¢ ); while player
2's payo® 2¡2±N+N0
+±N0
¸ 17=10¡¢; and thus there exists e ²>0 such that for ²<e ² payo®s lie above
the 45o line.
174.1 An Equilibrium of the Complete Information Game
The ¯rst step in our argument is the construction of an equilibrium of the complete
information game played by type 1 and player 2, ©1(±). In Lemma 4 we construct a
particular type of equilibrium where any feasible and strictly individually rational payo®
to type 1 can be obtained as an equilibrium payo®. This will consist of a continuation
equilibrium, in which type 1 receives a high payo®, precede by play which yields type
1 a low payo®; by extending this latter phase of play, the overall payo® will be reduced
towards any desired target payo®. It may be, however, that this process violates player 2's
individual rationality; each time this is threatened, a randomization by player 1 is used
to probabilistically reward player 2 so the latter has su±cient incentive to stick to this
path. In Section 4.2 we shall use these equilibrium strategies to construct an equilibrium
of a two-type incomplete information game.
Some additional notation is now necessary. For ² ¸ 0; de¯ne the set of feasible
(uniformly strictly for ²>0) individually rational payo®s for the complete information
game between type k and player 2: Gk(²): =f(Ak(¼);B(¼))jAk(¼) ¸ ^ ak + ²;B(¼) ¸
^ b + ²;¼ 2 ¢IJg, k 2 K. Next de¯ne ¹ ak(²)t ob et h el a r g e s tp a y o ®t ot y p ek in Gk(²)
and ak(²) to be the smallest such payo®, that is ¹ ak(²): =m a x f ak j (ak;b) 2 Gk(²) g,
and ak(²): =m i n f ak j (ak;b) 2 Gk(²) g.A l s o d e ¯ n e ¹ a := (¹ a1;:::;¹ aK) 2< K; where
¹ ak =¹ ak(0):7 We also use M to denote an upper bound on the absolute magnitude of the
players' payo®s, so that M ¸j Ak(i;j)j; jB(i;j)j, for all (i;j), k. De¯ne the function f,
where f :[ a1(0);¹ a1(0)] !< , to be the maximum feasible payo® to player 2 given that
type 1 receives the payo® a1,t h a ti s ,f(a1): =m a x f b j (a1;b) 2 G1(0) g. The function
f(:) is made up of a ¯nite number of linear segments. De¯ne S to be the maximum
absolute value of the slopes of these segments (this is ¯nite). In Lemma 4 we will also
need ¡s to denote the greatest negative slope of f(:)w h e nf(:) has a decreasing segment
(so s>0) and s =1o t h e r w i s e .
We start with two preliminary results. The ¯rst is an approximation result which al-
lows correlated strategies to be approximated by average behaviour along deterministic
sequences of action pro¯les.
7Note that the function ¹ ak(:)( ak(:)) maximizes (minimizes) a linear function on a set of linear in-
equalities that vary continuously in ².¹ ak(:)( ak(:)) is, therefore, continuous in a neighbourhood of zero.
18Result 2 Let ²>0 be given. There is a ^ ±(²) < 1 such that if ±>^ ±(²) and given any















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ · ²=2 s =0 ;1;2;:::;8k 2 K;
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The proof of Result 2 can be adapted from the proof of Lemma 2 in Fudenberg and
Maskin (1991). It follows immediately that given ²>0, there is a ±(²) ¸ ^ ±(²) such that
(ak;b) 2 Gk(²) are equilibrium payo®s for any ±>± (²).
Next, consider the following strategies, which will be used to construct an equilibrium
in which a single randomization occurs. The proof of Lemma 4 will require the iteration




1;b ¤) 2 G1(3²)a n d( x;f(x)) 2 G1(2²). Assume that ±>± (²).
Type 1 :I np e r i o d0p l a y^ {0 with probability ^ u and ~ { 6=^ {0 with probabil-
ity 1 ¡ ^ u.I f ( ^ {0;^ |0)i sp l a y e di np e r i o dz e r o ,c o n t i n u et op l a yt h es e q u e n c e
f^ {tg
T¡1
t=0 n times and then in period nT begin playing the equilibrium strategy
to get the payo®s (a¤
1;b ¤) 2 G1(3²). If (~ {;^ |0) is played in period zero, play the
in¯nite sequence of stage-game actions, determined by Result 2, to get the
payo®s (x;f(x)) 2 G1(2²). (Both payo® pro¯les are equilibrium payo®s by
the assumption that ±>± (²).) Minmax all deviations by player 2.
Player 2 :I np e r i o d0p l a y^ |0.I f( ^ {0;^ |0) is played in period zero continue to
play the sequence f^ |tg
T¡1
t=0 n times and then in period nT begin playing the
equilibrium strategy to get the payo®s (a¤
1;b ¤) 2 G1(3²). If (~ {;^ |0)i sp l a y e d
in period zero play the in¯nite sequence of stage-game actions, determined
by Result 2, to get the payo®s (x;f(x)) 2 G1(2²). Minmax all deviations by
player 1.
Call the strategies de¯ned above ^ ¾(n;a¤
1;b ¤;x)f o rt y p e1a n d^ ¿(n;a¤
1;b ¤;x)f o rp l a y e r
2 (we suppress the implicit dependence on ^ u and of the continuation equilibria on ±).
19Also de¯ne the strategies ^ ^ ¾(n;a¤
1;b ¤) for type 1 and ^ ^ ¿(n;a¤
1;b ¤) for player 2, which are the
same as ^ ¾(n;a¤
1;b ¤;x)a n d^ ¿(n;a¤
1;b ¤;x) except that they do not involve a randomization
in period 0, that is, type 1 always plays ^ {0 in period zero. De¯ne payo®s when there are
n complete rounds of the sequence to be played as a1(n): =( 1¡ ±nT) ^ A1 + ±nTa¤
1 and
b(n): =( 1¡ ±nT) ^ B + ±nTb¤. We will now establish the following result.
Lemma 3 Let ²>0 be given; also let f(^ {t;^ |t)g
T¡1
t=0 and ±¤(²) < 1 be so that ^ A1 :=
((1 ¡ ±)=(1 ¡ ±T))
PT¡1
s=0 ±sA1(^ {s;^ |s) < ^ a1 + ² for 1 >±>± ¤(²), and let (a¤
1;b ¤) 2 G1(3²)
with a1(2²)+²<a ¤
1 < ¹ a1(2²)¡²=2, also be given. If ±>maxf±(²);±¤(²);[4M=(²+4M)]1=Tg
and n ¸ 1 is the largest integer satisfying
b(n) > ^ b +2 ²; (15)
a1(n) >a 1(2²)+²=2; (16)
then (i) there exists (x;f(x)) 2 G1(2²) so that (^ ¾(n;a¤
1;b ¤;x); ^ ¿(n;a¤
1;b ¤;x)) is an equilib-
rium of ©1(±), and (ii) (^ ^ ¾(n;a¤
1;b);^ ^ ¿(n;a¤
1;b)) is an equilibrium of ©1(±).
Proof: We will ¯rst show that n ¸ 1. We have
a1(1) ¡ a1(2²) ¡ ²=2=a
¤
1 ¡ a1(2²) ¡ ²=2+( 1¡ ±





1 ¡ a1(2²) ¡ ²=2 ¡ (1 ¡ ±
T)2M:
By our assumption on a¤
1 and (1¡±T)2M<² = 2 by the assumption on ±, the bottom line
is positive. A similar argument shows b(1) > ^ b +2 ².
To prove (i), the strategies are an equilibrium of ©1(±) provided: (a) type 1 is in-
di®erent when she randomizes in period zero, and (b) no player prefers to deviate when
playing out the sequence f(^ {t;^ |t)g
T¡1
t=0 n times. Part (ii) follows if (b) holds. Type 1 is
indi®erent in period zero if we can ¯nd an equilibrium with the payo®s (x;f(x)) 2 G1(2²)









B u t( 1 7 )i m p l i e st h a tja1(n) ¡ xj < 2M(1 ¡ ±)=± < ²=2, where the last inequality follows
from our assumptions on ±. This implies a1(2²) <x<¹ a1(2²); the lower bound follows as
20a1(n)s a t i s ¯ e sa1(2²)+²=2 <a 1(n), and the upper bound is true since x · a¤
1+²=2 < ¹ a1(2²).
So there exists a pair (x;f(x)) 2 G1(2²)w h e r ex satis¯es (17).
Type 1's expected payo® from continuing to play the sequence when there are t









0) ¸¡ M(1 ¡ ±
T)+±
Ta1(n)
¸¡ M(1 ¡ ±
T)+±
T(^ a1 +2 ²) :
This follows as a1(n0) ¸ a1(n). Type 1's payo® from deviation is bounded above by (1 ¡
±T)M+±T^ a1, so a su±cient condition for deviation not to be pro¯table, ±T(²+M) ¸ M,i s
given in the proposition. An identical argument using the fact that b(n0) ¸ minfb(n);b ¤g
s h o w st h a tp l a y e r2a l s od o e sn o tb e n e ¯ tf r o md e v i a t i n gw h e nt h e ya r ep l a y i n go u tt h e
sequence n times. Q.E.D.
In the next lemma, we start with an equilibrium of ©1(±)w i t hp a y o ® s( a¤
1;b ¤)c l o s e
to the maximum feasible and individually rational payo® to type 1 in G1(3²). Using this
equilibrium we use Lemma 3 to ¯nd a new equilibrium with the payo®s (a1(n); ^ ub(n)+
(1¡ ^ u)[(1¡±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)]), where, by construction, a1(n) <a ¤
1. If the payo®s at this
new equilibrium satisfy (a1(n); ^ ub(n)+( 1¡ ^ u)[(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)]) 2 G1(3²)a n dt h e
condition a1(2²)+²<a 1(n) then it is possible to apply Lemma 3 a second time to ¯nd
a further equilibrium of ©1(±) where type 1 receives the payo® a1(n + n0) <a 1(n) <a ¤
1.
Again if this new equilibrium gives payo®s in G1(3²) and satisfying the same condition,
it will be possible to iterate the lemma a third time, to ¯nd further equilibria of ©1(±)
where type 1 receives even lower payo®s, and so on.
We de¯ne (^ ¾(N); ^ ¿(N)) to be the strategies that iteratively apply Lemma 3 to the
equilibrium with payo®s (a¤
1;b ¤) where the sequence f(^ {t;^ |t)g
T¡1
t=0 is played out in total N
times; each iteration uses the strategies (^ ¾;^ ¿) de¯ned above Lemma 3 except for the last
which uses (^ ^ ¾;^ ^ ¿) (so there is no initial randomization). (The dependence on ±,^ u, ² and
(a¤
1;b ¤) is suppressed.) There is an upper bound on the number of times Lemma 3 can
be applied, and hence on N;l e tNmax be this upper bound on N. (We show that the
strategies (^ ¾(Nmax); ^ ¿(Nmax)) will imply that a1 is close to a1(65
16²).) Randomizations by
player 1 occur at each new application of Lemma 3.
21Lemma 4 Let 0 <²<s (¹ a1(0)¡^ a1)=(10+3s) and C>0 be given and let f(^ {t;^ |t)g
T¡1
t=0 and
±¤(²) < 1 be so that ^ A1 := ((1 ¡ ±)=(1 ¡ ±T))
PT¡1
s=0 ±sA1(^ {s;^ |s) < ^ a1 + ² for 1 >±>± ¤(²).
There exists r > 0 and ~ ±(²) ¸ ±¤(²) such that: given (a¤
1;b ¤) 2 G1(3²) which satis¯es
¹ a1(2²) ¡ ²=2 >a ¤
1 > ¹ a1(3²) ¡ C²; a1 2 [a1(65
16²)+²;¹ a1(3²) ¡ C²],a n d±>~ ±(²); then there
exists an N such that (^ ¾(N); ^ ¿(N)) is an equilibrium of ©1(±) with a payo® to type 1 of
a1(N) within ²
32 of a1, and at this equilibrium type 1 departs from repeated play of the
sequence f(^ {t;^ |t)g
T¡1
t=0 (by playing ~ { instead of ^ {0 at the points of randomisation) with a
total probability of at most 1 ¡ r.
Proof: Let ~ ±(²): =m a x f±(²);±¤(²);[32M=(² +3 2 M)]1=T;1 ¡ ²=[32M(S +1)] ;1 ¡ ²(¹ a1(0) ¡
^ a1)=9M2; 1¡s²(¹ a1(0)¡^ a1)=(16M2(1+s))g. This lower bound on ± implies that if x and
y are any two feasible payo®s for player i,t h e n
jx ¡ [(1 ¡ ±
T)y + ±
Tx]j =( 1¡ ±
T)jx ¡ yj < (1 ¡ ±
T)2M<² = 16: (18)
We will ¯rst show that it is possible to choose ^ u · 0:5 strictly positive, independent of
±, such that the payo® to type 1 at the equilibrium (^ ¾(Nmax); ^ ¿(Nmax)) is no greater than
a1(65
16²)+². It is impossible to apply Lemma 3 another time if a1(Nmax) · a1(2²)+²,b u t
in this case the result is proved. We will now suppose that a1(Nmax) >a 1(2²)+²,w h i c h
implies that in the last feasible iteration of Lemma 3 the constraint a1(n) >a 1(2²)+²=2
does not bind (cf. the argument in the ¯rst paragraph of the proof of Lemma 3). Thus,
instead, in the last feasible iteration of Lemma 3 the constraint b(n) > ^ b+2² binds (where
now b(n) is de¯ned using the strategies which iterate Lemma 3) and Lemma 3 cannot be
reapplied because (a1(n); ^ ub(n)+(1¡^ u)[(1¡±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)]) 62 G1(3²). There are now
two separate cases to consider: (1) If ^ ub(n)+(1¡ ^ u)[(1¡±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)] ¸ ^ b+3²,b u t
(a1(n); ^ ub(n)+(1¡^ u)[(1¡±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)]) 62 G1(3²), then it must be that a1(n) <a 1(3²).
(2) If ^ ub(n)+( 1¡ ^ u)[(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)] < ^ b +3 ²,t h e nb(n) > ^ b +2 ² implies
(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |
0)+±f(x) < ^ b +2 ² +
²
1 ¡ ^ u
· ^ b +4 ² (19)
(which follows as ^ u · 0:5). Player 1's equilibrium payo® is a1(n)=( 1¡±)A(~ {;^ |0)+±x,b y
indi®erence. The point (a1(n);(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)) is in the feasible set and is within
²=16 of the point (x;f(x)), by (18). We know that f(x) < ^ b + 65
16², from (18) and (19).
If f(x) is non-decreasing, therefore, it follows that x<a 1(65
16²). This and (18) applied
22again implies a1(n) <a 1(65
16²)+ 1
16².I f ,h o w e v e r ,f(x) is decreasing over part of its range,
f(x) < ^ b + 65
16² can also imply that x>¹ a1(65
16²)a n da1(n) > ¹ a1(65
16²) ¡ 1
16². We will now
show that ^ u c a nb ec h o s e n( i n d e p e n d e n t l yo f± and ²) su±ciently small so that this second
alternative cannot apply. To be precise we will show that we can choose ^ u>0s u ± c i e n t l y
small (but independent of ± and ²)s ot h a t^ ub(n)+(1¡ ^ u)[(1¡±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)] > ^ b+3²
whenever x>¹ a1(65
16²). As b(n) ¸ ^ b +2 ², it is su±cient to show that there exists some
e>0 such that for all 0 <²<s (¹ a1(0) ¡ ^ a1)=(10 + 3s)a n d±>~ ±(²)i ti st h ec a s et h a t
(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x) > ^ b +( 3+e)². By (17) it is su±cient to show that











> ^ b +( 3+e)²: (20)
There must be at least one iteration of the strategies for the constraint to bind, so we
will write (a1(n);b(n)) = (1 ¡ ±Tn)( ^ A1; ^ B)+±Tn(a
y
1;b y)w h e r e( a
y
1;b y) 2 G1(3²)i st h e
continuation equilibrium payo® after n iterations of the ¯nite sequence. By construction
a
y
1 >a 1(n) > ¹ a1(65
16²)¡²=16. If x>¹ a1(65
16²) implies f(x) < ^ b+ 65
16²,t h e nf(:) contains linear
segments with strictly negative slope. Recall that ¡s is the largest strictly negative slope
of f(:) (the °attest downward sloping segment). A line through (a
y
1;b y) with slope ¡s will
lie below f(x0) for x0 2 [¹ a1(65
16²);a
y
1], that is, by¡s(x0¡a
y




Now we establish that x<a
y
1. The constraint b(n) > ^ b +2 ² binds and any further
iterations of the ¯nite sequence will violate the constraint, so from (18) it must be that
^ b + 33
16²>(1 ¡ ±Tn) ^ B + ±Tnby > ^ b +2 ². This implies a lower bound on 1 ¡ ±nT and thus
al o w e rb o u n do na
y
1 ¡ a1(n)o f( by ¡ ^ b ¡ 33
16²)(a
y
1 ¡ ^ A1)=(by ¡ ^ B). However, by ¸ ^ b +3 ²
and by ¡ ^ B<2M,s oa
y
1 ¡ a1(n) > 15
32M²(a
y
1 ¡ ^ A1). The de¯nition of ¡s implies that
¹ a1(65
16²) > ¹ a1(0)¡ 65²
16s,s oa
y
1¡ ^ A1 > ¹ a1(65
16²)¡ 1
16²¡^ a1¡² ¸ ¹ a1(0)¡^ a1¡ ²
16(65
s +17), where
the ¯rst inequality follows from a
y
1 > ¹ a1(65
16²) ¡ ²
16 and ^ A1 < ^ a1 + ². If this inequality is
substituted into the earlier one we get
a
y














(¹ a1(0) ¡ ^ a1): (21)
The last inequality follows from the upper bound on ². By construction j a1(n) ¡ x j<
(1 ¡ ±)2M, so the lower bound on ± (± ¸ 1 ¡ ²(¹ a1(0) ¡ ^ a1)=9M2) ensures j a1(n) ¡ x j<
a
y
1 ¡ a1(n). This establishes that x<a
y
1, and the construction at the end of the previous
paragraph can be used. Therefore, a su±cient condition for (20) is
















> ^ b +( 3+e)²:











y ¡^ b ¡ 3²)+s(a
y
1 ¡ a1(n)) >e ² : (22)
Replacing the ¯rst term by a lower bound, noting that the second term in (22) is nonneg-
ative by construction, and using (21),a su±cient condition for this is
¡(1 ¡ ±)(1 + s)2M +
15s²
64M
(¹ a1(0) ¡ ^ a1) >e ² (23)
The lower bound on ± (± ¸ 1¡s²(¹ a1(0) ¡ ^ a1)=(16M2(1+s))) implies that the coe±cient
on ² on the left of (23) is at least 7s(¹ a1(0)¡^ a1)=64M. As (23) is su±cient for a
y
1 ¸ x,a n
e with the requisite properties exists, and we have completed this part of the proof.
The payo® to type 1 at the equilibrium (^ ¾(Nmax); ^ ¿(Nmax)) is thus no greater than
a1(65
16²)+². Therefore, type 1's payo® at the equilibrium (^ ¾(N); ^ ¿(N)) ranges from less
than a1(65
16²)+² (for N large) to a¤
1 > ¹ a1(3²)¡C² (for N = 0). By (18), type 1's payo® at
the equilibrium (^ ¾(N); ^ ¿(N)) decreases by at most ²=16 as N increases in integer steps.
T h u st h e r em u s tb eav a l u eN for which type 1's payo® is within ²=32 of any point in
[a1(65
16²)+²;a1(3²) ¡ C²].
Fix a particular (a¤
1;b ¤) satisfying the conditions of the lemma statement and a ±>
~ ±(²). The equilibrium (^ ¾(Nmax); ^ ¿(Nmax)) is well de¯ned, so: there are only a ¯nite number
of periods when the sequence f(^ {t;^ |t)g
T¡1
t=0 is played and there are only a ¯nite number
of occasions when type 1 randomizes over the actions ^ {0 and ~ {. Thus, there is a strictly
positive probability r of always playing ^ {0 and not deviating from the sequence. We
now need to prove that the number of randomizations between n = Nmax and n =0i s
bounded above by a number independent of ± and (a¤
1;b ¤). For a given ± and (a¤
1;b ¤), at
the equilibrium (^ ¾(Nmax); ^ ¿(Nmax)), let a1(n)a n da1(n + n0)b ep l a y e r1 ' sp a y o ®a tt w o
consecutive randomizations (assuming there are at least 2 randomizations). Recall that
there is no randomization at the start of the very ¯rst period of play, so n + n0 <N max.




n0T) ^ B + ±
n0Tf^ ub(n)+( 1¡ ^ u)[(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |
0)+±f(x)]g > ^ b +2 ²; (24)
where x is chosen as in (17). (If there are any randomizations, then ^ B<^ b +2 ²,b e c a u s e
otherwise the constraint (15) will not bind.) By de¯nition of there being a randomization
24at n + n0 the inequality in (24) must be violated for one more iteration of the ¯nite
sequence, that is, n+n0+1 (since the constraint a1(n+n0) >a 1(2²)+1
2² c a no n l yb i n d|
in the sense that additional play of the sequence f(^ {t;^ |t)g
T¡1
t=0 w o u l dl e a dt oi t sv i o l a t i o n
|a tn + n0 = Nmax). The inequality (24) is therefore reversed when n0 is replaced by
n0 + 1. This gives an upper bound on ±(n0+1)T. ±T is bounded below by the assumption
±>~ ±, so we then get an upper bound on ±Tn 0:
(1 + ²=32M)(^ b +2 ² ¡ ^ B)
^ ub(n)+( 1¡ ^ u)[(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)] ¡ ^ B
>±
n0T:
But a1(n + n0)=( 1¡ ±Tn0) ^ A1 + ±Tn 0a1(n)a n d ^ A1 < ^ a1 + ², so an upper bound on ±n0T
implies an upper bound on a1(n + n0):
a1(n + n
0) ¡ ^ A1 < (a1(n) ¡ ^ A1)
(
(1 + ²=32M)(^ b +2 ² ¡ ^ B)
^ ub(n)+( 1¡ ^ u)[(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)] ¡ ^ B
)
:
The above expression implies that a1(n)¡ ^ A1 declines exponentially, at a rate independent
of ±; i ft h et e r mi nb r a c e si sb o u n d e db e l o wo n e .I ft h i si st h ec a s ew ew i l lb ea b l et os h o w
that a ¯nite number of randomizations are needed for a1(Nmax) · a1(2²)+1
2².As u ± c i e n t
condition for the term in braces to be bounded strictly below unity for all ±>~ ±(²)i st h a t





^ ub(n)+( 1¡ ^ u)[(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)] ¡ ^ B
^ b +2 ² ¡ ^ B
; 8 1 >±>~ ±(²): (25)
Subtracting unity from each side and then noticing that the denominator on the right is
strictly less than 2M gives the following su±cient condition
²
16
< ^ ub(n)+( 1¡ ^ u)[(1 ¡ ±)B(~ {;^ |
0)+±f(x)] ¡^ b ¡ 2²; 8 1 >±>~ ±(²):
There is a randomization at the payo® a1(n), so by the argument at the start of the proof
^ ub(n)+(1¡ ^ u)[(1¡±)B(~ {;^ |0)+±f(x)] is strictly greater than ^ b+3². Thus this su±cient
condition must hold. We have shown that after the ¯rst randomization the value a1(n)¡ ^ A1
declines (at least) exponentially with each randomization at some constant rate, say Ã<1;
independently of ±.T h a ti s ,a1(n+n0)¡ ^ A1 <Ã [a1(n)¡ ^ A1]( w h e r en and (n+n0) refer to
consecutive randomizations, as before). Since ^ A1 < ^ a1+² this implies a1(n+n0)¡(^ a1+²) <
Ã[a1(n) ¡ (^ a1 + ²)]. Thus even if the ¯rst iteration (i.e., up to the ¯rst randomization)
had an arbitrarily small e®ect, and since a1 at the ¯rst randomization is bounded above
25by ¹ a1, it follows that after h randomizations a1(n) ¡ (^ a1 + ²) <Ã h¡1[¹ a1 ¡ (^ a1 + ²)]. If
h¤ satis¯es Ãh¤¡1 <² [¹ a1 ¡ (^ a1 + ²)]¡1 we can be certain that at most h¤ randomizations
are required before a1(n) · a1(2²)+1
2², and that there is a strictly positive lower bound




The lemma asserts that the total probability with which player 1 departs from repetitions
o ft h es e q u e n c e( b yp l a y i n g~ { at one of the points of randomization) is bounded below
one. Lemma 4 is essential because we can adapt its construction to build an equilibrium
where player 1 is one of two di®erent types: type k always plays the ¯xed sequence of
actions and type 1 plays the sequence with occasional randomizations. By requiring the
probability of type k to be su±ciently small (in particular it must be less than r), and by
adjusting the probability that type 1 plays ~ {, the actions of the two types will combine to
reproduce the strategy ^ ¾(N) and the optimal response by player 2 thus remains ^ ¿(N).
4.2 The Repeated Game of Incomplete Information
There are several lemmas needed before the proof of Theorem 3 can be given. Using A.1 we
can now describe a particular equilibrium, which we refer to as the terminal equilibrium.
The terminal equilibrium is revealing in the sense that there is an initial signalling phase,
where each player signals her type with possible pooling, and no information is revealed
thereafter. In general the incentive compatibility conditions (that each type should have
no incentive to send the signal associated with another type) will bind most tightly at
such an equilibrium. We therefore choose the payo®s at the equilibrium so type k receives
a payo® close to ¹ ak(²): (This was why, in Lemma 4, terminal payo®s were restricted to be
high.) The terminal equilibrium will serve to describe the players' long-run behaviour in
¡(p;±), apart from on paths on which player 1 reveals herself to be type 1 earlier in the
game.
Lemma 5 Given A.1, there exists an ~ ²>0 such that for all ²<~ ²:t h e r ee x i s t sa¹ ±(²) < 1
such that for all ±>¹ ±(²) and all p 2 ¢K the game ¡(p;±) has an equilibrium with payo®s,
((¹ ®1;:::; ¹ ®K); ¹ ¯), that satisfy:
(a) ¹ ak(3²)¡ 1
2² ¸ ¹ ®k > ¹ ak(3²)¡C² for some constant C, independent of ² and ±,a n df o r
26k =1 ;2;:::;K;
(b) ¹ ¯ ¸ ^ b +3 ².
Proof: We start by constructing correlated strategies that give the players payo®s close




f ¼ 2 ¢
IJ j Ak(¼) · ¹ ak(3²) ¡
3
4
²; B(¼) ¸ ^ b +4 ²g:
D0 has a non-empty interior, by A.1. D² is de¯ned by K +1 linear inequalities which are
continuous in ² and become tighter as ² increases. De¯ne ^ ²>0t ob et h el a r g e s t² such
that D² 6= ; for all ² · ^ ².F o rk =1 ;2;:::;K and ² · ^ ²,c h o o s e¼¤
k(²) to maximize Ak(:)
on the constraint set D²; obviously Ak(¼¤
k(0)) = ¹ ak(0). We will de¯ne ~ ² to be the largest
value of ² · ^ ² such that the vector (Ak(¼¤
k(²))k2K)i s3 ²-IR.
We will now show that there exists a constant Co, independent of ² and ±,s ot h a t
C
o²>¹ ak(3²) ¡ Ak(¼
¤
k(²)); for ² · ~ ²;8 k: (26)
Let k be given. For ¸ 2 [0;1] de¯ne ¼¸ := ¸¼y+(1¡¸)¼¤
k(0), where ¼y 2 D~ ². By linearity
B(¼¸) ¸ ¸(^ b+4~ ²)+(1¡¸)^ b,s o¼¸ is a feasible solution to maxf Ak(¼) j B(¼) ¸ ^ b+¸4~ ²g.
Thus ¹ ak(¸~ ²) ¸ Ak(¼¸)=¸Ak(¼y)+( 1¡ ¸)¹ ak(0). Let ¸ = ²=~ ² for 0 · ² · ~ ²; then this
implies
¹ ak(²) ¸ ¹ ak(0) ¡ ²
¹ ak(0) ¡ Ak(¼y)
~ ²
; 8 ²<~ ²:
De¯ne Ck to be the term that multiplies ²; then for ²<~ ² and 8 k;
¹ ak(²) ¸ ¹ ak(0) ¡ Ck²; (27)
and note that Ck is a constant independent of ² and ±. Consider again, for a ¯xed k; the
correlated strategy ¼¸.I f ¸ ¸ ²=~ ²,t h e n¼¸ satis¯es the constraint B(¼¸) ¸ ^ b +4 ².I f
¸ ¸ ²(3
4 +3 Ck0)=(¹ ak0(0) ¡ Ak0(¼y)) for all k0,t h e n¼¸ satis¯es the constraint Ak0(¼¸) ·
¹ ak0(3²) ¡ 3
4² for all k0 (note: such ¸ is less than one for ² small). This second condition
follows from rearranging the below su±cient condition for the constraint:
(1 ¡ ¸)¹ ak0(0) + ¸Ak0(¼




(it is su±cient since the LHS of (28) is an upper bound for Ak0(¼¸), while the RHS is
no greater than ¹ ak0(3²) ¡ 3
4² by (27)). Thus ¼¸ 2 D² if ¸ ¸ E², where E is a positive
27constant. The value Ak(¼E²) is, therefore, a lower bound on Ak(¼¤
k(²)) for ²<1=E.T h i s
implies that
¹ ak(3²) ¡ Ak(¼
¤
k(²)) · ¹ ak(0) ¡ Ak(¼
E²)=E[¹ ak(0) ¡ Ak(¼
y)]²
for ²<x , for some x>0, and thus a constant Co
k exists such that for ²<x , Co
k²>
¹ ak(3²) ¡ Ak(¼¤
k(²)). It follows that on any compact interval for which ¹ ak(3²) ¡ Ak(¼¤
k(²))
is de¯ned a linear upper bound exists with ¯nite slope, and in particular it has a linear
upper bound on [0;~ ²], and (26) follows.



























k); 8k 2 K:
By Result 2 we can also choose these sequences so that, for all k, k0,p l a y e rk0's continuation
payo®s, if play follows fit
k;jt
k)g1
t=0, are within ²=2o fAk0(¼¤
k(²)) at all future times. These
sequences will be our equilibrium path actions. As (Ak(¼¤
k(²))k2K)i s3 ²-IR there is a pro¯le
of IR payo®s (¸ !k)k2K, satisfying ¸ !k +3 ² · Ak(¼¤
k(²)), and player 1 will be punished for
an observable deviation by being held down to ¸ !k + ² for all k:
In this proof we will choose ¹ ±(²) < 1s ot h a t( i )¹ ±(²) > ^ ±(²), (ii) ¹ ±(²) >± ², (iii)
¹ ±(²) > [16M=(16M + ²)]1=K,( i v )¹ ±(²) > [(^ b +3 ² + M)=(^ b +4 ² + M)]1=K for all k.T h e
second condition ensures that player 2 can hold the types of player 1 to within ² of any
IR payo®s. The third ensures that the loss from signalling is at most ²=8a n dt h el a s t
condition will ensure that player 2 never gets less than ^ b +3 ².
We now take ²<~ ² to be given. We now show that the following strategies are an
equilibrium of ¡(p;±): Player 2 begins by playing the ¯xed sequence of actions associated
with type 1, fjt
1g, and if he observes player 1 deviating from her corresponding sequence
fit
1g in period t, for t =0 ;1;:::;K ¡ 2, he interprets this move as a signal that player 1 is
type k = t+2. W h ent ypek is signalled he then begins to play out the sequence fjt
kg1
t=0
from the beginning and expects player 1 to play out the corresponding sequence fit
kg1
t=0.
If player 1 deviates from the sequence fit
1g in period t>K¡ 2, or deviates from the
28sequence fit
kg once type k has been signalled, then player 2 punishes these deviations by
holding her to the payo®s (¸ !k)k2K + ²1 (de¯ned above). This is possible as ±>± ².E a c h
of player 1's types plays a best response to this strategy of player 2 and minmaxes player
2 if he deviates from the above strategy.
If type k signals truthfully, then her expected payo® is bounded below by ¹ ak(3²) ¡
Co² ¡ 1
8².( W eh a v es h o w nt h a tAk(¼¤
k(²)) > ¹ ak(3²) ¡ Co² and the assumption 16M(1 ¡
±K) <² ± K implies that the payo®s over the ¯rst K ¡ 1 periods contribute at most ²=8
to her total payo®.) Thus the optimal response of type k to 2's strategy must give her
ap a y o ® ,¹ ®k, satisfying ¹ ®k > ¹ ak(3²) ¡ (Co + 1
8)², since she always has the option of
signalling truthfully. Then once we have established equilibrium, the lower bound on
equilibrium payo®s to player 1 will be as required with C = Co + 1
8. In general the
optimal response for type k will be to signal some type k0 (which may be k itself) and
n e v e rt ot r i g g e rt h ep u n i s h m e n tf r o mp l a y e r2 .S u p p o s et h i si sf a l s e ,s ot h a ti ti so p t i m a l
for type k to signal type k0 and to trigger the punishment after s periods of following




in its entirety can be decomposed into her average payo® over the ¯rst s periods, x,a n d
her average payo® over the remaining periods, y,t h a ti s ,Ak(¼¤
k0(²)) = (1 ¡ ±s)x + ±sy.
By the construction of the sequence of actions, at any point in time the continuation
payo® satis¯es y ¸ Ak(¼¤
k0(²)) ¡ ²=2. These two facts imply an upper bound on x:
(1 ¡ ±s)x · (1 ¡ ±s)Ak(¼¤
k0(²)) + ±s²=2. Her payo® (discounted to the period after the
signal is sent) from following the action sequence of type k0 and then deviating in period







s+1(¸ !k + ²): (29)
If she prefers to be punished from time s,t h e nAk(¼¤
k0(²)) · ¸ !k +2 5 ²=16, because her
payo® from continuing to play fit
k0g1
t=0 is at least Ak(¼¤
k0(²))¡²=2 by the construction of the
action sequences, and the deviation payo® is at most (1¡±)M+±(¸ !k+²) · ¸ !k+²(1+1=16).
This upper bound for Ak(¼¤
k0(²)) and the bound on ± i m p l i e st h a t( 2 9 )i sl e s st h a n¸ !k+2².
By the de¯nition of ~ ² the payo®s (Ak(¼¤
k(²))k2K are 3²-IR, so this is strictly less than the
payo® from truthful revelation, described above, which gives a contradiction. Likewise,
an observable deviation during the signalling leads to a payo® of at most ¸ !k+²+ 1
8²,w h i c h
is less than the payo® from truthful revelation. Type k's equilibrium payo®s can now be
29broken down into a payo® from signalling and a payo® Ak(¼¤
k0(²)) after signalling. This is
bounded above by (1 ¡±K)M +±K(¹ ak(3²)¡ 3
4²), by de¯nition of ¼¤
k0(²). Assumption (iii)
on ± e n s u r e st h a tt h i si sl e s st h a n¹ ak(3²) ¡ 1
2². The upper bound on equilibrium payo®s
is established.
Player 2's expected payo® is determined by playing at most K ¡ 1 arbitrary actions
followed by one of the ¯xed sequences f(it
k;jt
k)g. His equilibrium payo® is therefore no less
than (1¡±K)(¡M)+±K(^ b+4²). This lower bound is strictly greater than ^ b+3² (by the
fourth assumption on ±). This proves part (b) of the Lemma. His payo® from a deviation
is at most (1¡±)(M)+±^ b, so we have also shown that player 2 cannot pro¯tably deviate
from the strategy above. Q.E.D.
T h en e x tr e s u l td e t e r m i n e sK ¡ 1 correlated strategies (¼2;:::;¼K) 2 (¢IJ)K¡1.I t
shows that: (a) each correlated strategy holds type 1 to at most her minmax level; (b)
normalizing for the e®ect on type 1's payo®, each correlated strategy satis¯es an incentive
compatibility condition; (c) there is an individually rational point z 2< K where type 1
receives her minmax payo® and type k>1 receives a convex combination of her payo® ¹ ak
and the payo® she gets from playing the correlated strategy, that is ¹ ak +¸k(Ak(¼k)¡¹ ak),
where the weight ¸k is chosen to produce a convex combination which holds type 1 to her
minmax level when type 1 uses the same correlated strategy ¼k,¹ a1+¸k(A1(¼k)¡¹ a1)=^ a1.
In the construction used in the proof of Theorem 3, each correlated strategy ¼k will be
approximated by a ¯nite sequence of actions played by type k; condition (b) will be used
to ensure that no type k would want to send the signal associated with k0 6= k while z
will be used to ensure that on the equilibrium path all types receive individually rational
payo®s. From (b) the ¼k are chosen to maximise the rate at which type k acquires payo®
relative to the rate at which type 1's falls. This will be shown to imply that given the
choice between following the prescribed path for type k and deviating when type 1 has
a given continuation payo®, and following the prescribed path for type k0 and deviating
when type 1 has the same continuation payo®, type k would always prefer the former.
Lemma 6 Assume A.1, then there exist correlated strategies (¼2;:::;¼K) 2 (¢IJ)K¡1 such
that:
(a) A1(¼k) · ^ a1 for all k =2 ;3;:::;K,
30(b) (Ak(¼k) ¡ ¹ ak)=(¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k)) ¸ (Ak(¼k0) ¡ ¹ ak)=(¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k0))
for all k;k0 =2 ;3;:::;K,
(c) z is individually rational, where
z :=
Ã
^ a1;¹ a2 +
¹ a1 ¡ ^ a1
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼2)
(A2(¼2) ¡ ¹ a2);:::;¹ aK +
¹ a1 ¡ ^ a1
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼K)
(AK(¼K) ¡ ¹ aK)
!
: (30)
Proof: Consider the constrained optimization
max
¼2¢IJ
Ak(¼) ¡ ¹ ak
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼)
; subject to A1(¼) · ^ a1: (31)
As ¹ a1 > ^ a1, by assumption A.1, the maximand is well de¯ned. As the constraint set is non-
empty (by the Minimax Theorem) and compact there is a solution ¼k to the optimization
for all k>1.
We aim to show that the point z, de¯ned above, is individually rational. We must,
therefore, show that the set fxjx · zg is approachable. By Zamir (1992), for example, it
is su±cient to show that for any q 2< K with q ¸ 0 there exists a mixed action, g, for
player 2 such that
q((A1(i;g);:::;AK(i;g)) ¡ z) · 0; 8i 2 I: (32)
Let ^ g be a mixed strategy that ensures player 2 receives his minmax level (B(i;^ g) ¸ ^ b for
all i 2 I)a n dl e t^ g1 be a mixed strategy that minmaxes type 1 (A1(i; ^ g1) · ^ a1 for all i 2 I).
We will show that for any q ¸ 0e i t h e rg =^ g or g =^ g1 will ensure (32) holds. If (32) holds
for all q when g =^ g then there is nothing to prove. Suppose that for some q ¸ 0 (32) does
not hold with g =^ g; then there exists i 2 I such that q((A1(i;^ g);:::;A K(i; ^ g)) ¡ z) > 0.
By the de¯nition of ¹ a,¹ ak ¸ Ak(i; ^ g), and together with the fact that q ¸ 0, this implies
q(¹ a ¡ z) > 0. A substitution from the de¯nition of z s h o w st h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o






Ak(¼k) ¡ ¹ ak
A1(¼k) ¡ ¹ a1
!
> 0: (33)
We must show that if (33) holds, q((A1(i;^ g1);:::;AK(i;^ g1)) ¡ z) · 0 for all i 2 I.I t
is su±cient to show q((A1(¼);:::;AK(¼)) ¡ z) · 0 for all ¼ such that A1(¼) · ^ a1.A
substitution for z then gives
q((A1(¼);:::;AK(¼)) ¡ z)





Ak(¼) ¡ ¹ ak +( ¹ a1 ¡ ^ a1)
Ak(¼k) ¡ ¹ ak
A1(¼k) ¡ ¹ a1
!





Ak(¼) ¡ ¹ ak
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼)
+
¹ a1 ¡ ^ a1
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼)
Ak(¼k) ¡ ¹ ak
A1(¼k) ¡ ¹ a1
!






Ak(¼k) ¡ ¹ ak
A1(¼k) ¡ ¹ a1
!
· 0 8¼ such that A1(¼) · ^ a1:
The ¯rst inequality arises because ¼ is replaced by ¼k in (Ak(¼) ¡ ¹ ak)=(¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼)) and
this is therefore maximized on the set of ¼'s with A1(¼) · ^ a1. The ¯nal inequality
then follows from (33). Thus if q((A1(i;^ g);:::;AK(i; ^ g)) ¡ z) > 0i tm u s tb et r u et h a t
q((A1(i; ^ g1);:::;AK(i; ^ g1)) ¡ z) · 0. We can conclude that z is individually rational.
Q.E.D.
In Lemma 7 we de¯ne K ¡ 1 ¯nite sequences of actions that approximate the corre-
lated strategies (¼2;:::;¼K).
Lemma 7 For any ²>0 there exists ±0(²) < 1, a ¯nite integer T>0 and K ¡ 1




s=0 ,f o rk0 =2 ;3;:::;K, such that for all 1 >±>± 0(²):
(a) j ^ Ak;k0 ¡ Ak(¼k0)j <² = 2 for k 2 K, k0 =2 ;3;:::;K; (b) j ^ Bk0 ¡ B(¼k0)j <² = 2 for






















Proof: For k0 =2 ;3;:::;K,l e t¼(k0) be a rational approximation to the correlated strat-
egy ¼k0, such that k¼k0 ¡ ¼(k0)k <² = 4 for k0 =2 ;3;:::;K. There exists a positive integer
T such that T¼(k0)ij is an integer for all k0 =2 ;3;:::;K, i 2 I and j 2 J,( w h e r e¼(k)ij
denotes the ijth element of the correlated strategy ¼(k)). Choose the K ¡ 1 sequences




s=0 .C o n -
tinuity then ensures that there exists ±0(²) such that for all ±>± 0(²) the result holds.
Q.E.D.
We now prove our main result. It contains two main elements. The ¯rst element
of the proof is an investigation of the two-type game where only type 1 and type k are
given positive probability by player 2. We describe an equilibrium of this game where the
combined actions of the players (i.e., using the priors over player 1's types) replicate the
32strategies (^ ¾(N); ^ ¿(N)), described in Lemma 4: type k repeatedly plays the ¯nite sequence
of Lemma 7, while type 1 occasionally randomizes. As there is strictly positive probability
that this sequence is played out in full, provided the probability of type k is less than r,
it is possible for the combined actions of the types to replicate the strategy ^ ¾(N). And if
the sequence is played out in full the players settle down at the equilibrium described in
Lemma 5. In this construction we will use Lemma 6 to de¯ne punishments. By Lemma 4
we can therefore deduce that, provided type 1 is given su±ciently high probability, there
is an equilibrium where type 1's payo® is arbitrarily close to any a1 2 [a1(0);¹ a1(0)]. Next,
the strategies remain an equilibrium if an initial random move by type 1 is added, at which
type 1 reveals herself with a high probability and after this plays out an equilibrium of
the full information game where player 2 receives the payo® b. Provided the probability
of type 1 is su±ciently high, this allows us to ¯nd an equilibrium of the two-type game
where given any pair (a1;b) 2 G1(0); type 1's equilibrium payo® is close to a1 and player
2's payo® is close to b. The second step in the construction is an initial signalling phase
where each type k>1of player 1 sends a distinct signal, while type 1 randomly selects
one of the signals. Assuming that p1 is su±ciently high, after this signalling phase player
2 assigns positive probability only to type 1 and one other k>1; with arbitrarily high
probability on type 1. Consequently the argument of part 1 of the proof can be applied.
(It is necessary for type 1 to send each signal with su±ciently positive probability, since
otherwise player 2 will assign too high a probability to the type k>1 after the signalling
phase for the earlier argument to be applied.) Two main di±culties in the construction:
¯rst, ensuring the indi®erence of type 1 between each of the signals, which requires that
player 2 randomizes in the period that each type k signals and that the outcome of player
2's randomization determines the equilibrium of the two type game that is subsequently
played. The second di±culty is checking that none of the types k>1 can pro¯tably
deviate by sending a signal other than the assigned one.
Proof of Theorem 3: Some de¯nitions and notation: Choose Q>0 to be a linear
upper bound on the di®erence between ¹ ak(²)a n d¹ ak for all ² 2 (0;¹ ²)a n df o ra l lk (where
¹ ² is de¯ned in Assumption A.1); in particular, choose Q so that
¹ ak ¡ ¹ ak(3²)+3 ²=4 <Q ² 8k 2 K; 0 <²<¹ ²: (35)
33(See, e.g., the argument for (27) in Lemma 5.) We will also de¯ne a non-negative constant
R as follows (where ¼k is de¯ned in Lemma 6):
R := max
k
? ? ? ? ?
¹ ak ¡ Ak(¼k)
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k)
? ? ? ? ?: (36)
F r o mL e m m a6 ( b )w eh a v et h a t
Ak(¼k) ¡ ¹ ak
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k)
¸
Ak(¼k0) ¡ ¹ ak
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k0)
; 8k;k
0 =2 ;3;:::;K: (37)
We will begin by assuming that this inequality is strict when k 6= k0,t h a ti s ,
Ak(¼k) ¡ ¹ ak
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k)
>
Ak(¼k0) ¡ ¹ ak
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k0)
; 8k;k
0 =2 ;3;:::;K; k 6= k
0: (38)
(We will deal with the case of k 6= k0 satisfying (37) with equality at the end of the proof.)
Finally, Y is de¯ned to be the slope (with 2's payo®s in the numerator) of G1(0) when
this set is a line segment (IntG1(0) = ;) and when IntG1(0) 6= ; we de¯ne Y =1 .Y is
bounded above and strictly positive by Assumption A.1.
Let ¶>0b eg i v e n ,w h e r e¶<minf¹ ²;~ ²g (¹ ² is de¯ned in A.1, ~ ² in Lemma 5). Choose
0 <²<(¹ a1(0) ¡ ^ a1)=3s ot h a t :( i )3 ²<¶ ; (ii) for all k;k0 =2 ;3;:::;K with k 6= k0 it is
true that for all ±>± 0(²)
^ Ak;k ¡ xk
x1 ¡ ^ A1;k
>
^ Ak;k0 ¡ xk
x1 ¡ ^ A1;k0
+( 2+R)²;
^ Ak;k ¡ xk
x1 ¡ ^ A1;k
<R+1 ; (39)
for all xk 2 (¹ ak(3²)¡C²;¹ ak(3²)¡ 1
2²]a n d a l l x1 2 (¹ a1(3²)¡C²;¹ a1(3²)¡ 1
2²], where ^ Ak;k0
and ±0(²) are as de¯ned in Lemma 7; (iii) ¸ 2 [0;1] such that ¸^ a1+(1¡¸)¹ a1 > ^ a1+¶¡²=2
implies ¸z +( 1¡ ¸)¹ a is (2 + (Q +2 ) ( R +1 ) ) ²-IR; (iv) a1(65
16²)+²<a 1(¶) < ¹ a1(3²) ¡ C²
where C is de¯ned in Lemma 5 (a1(¶) < ¹ a1(0), because G1(¹ ²) is non-empty by Assumption
A.1 and ¶<¹ ²; so the last inequality holds for small ²); (v) ¶>[8(9=8)K¡2¡7]²maxfY;1g.
((ii) is possible because ¹ ak(3²)¡C² is continuous in ² at zero and j ^ Ak;k0 ¡ Ak(¼k0)j <² = 2
(by Lemma 7) and the strict inequality (38) holds. (iii) is possible because the sets of
²-IR payo®s are convex and these sets converge to the set of IR payo®s as ² ! 0. So (a)
as the point ¹ a is (2+(Q+2)(R+1))²-IR for ² su±ciently small, (b) the set of ²-IR payo®s
is convex and converges to the set of IR payo®s as ² ! 0, and (c) the point z is IR, the
convex combination (1 ¡ ¸)z + ¸¹ a, for a given ¸<1 will be (2 + (Q +2 ) ( R +1 ) ) ²-IR
provided ² is su±ciently small.) Given this value for ²,l e tT and ±0(²) be as de¯ned in
34Lemma 7, and setting ±¤(²)=±0(²), let ~ ±(²) be as de¯ned in Lemma 4 (each of the K ¡1
¯nite sequences speci¯ed in Lemma 7 satis¯es the conditions of Lemma 4; ~ ±(²) depends
on them only through T). Choose ±¶ =m a x f~ ±(²);± ²; ¹ ±(²);(4M=(4M + ²2))1=Kg,w h e r e±²
is de¯ned below De¯nition 2 and ¹ ±(²)i sd e ¯ n e di nL e m m a5 .
1. The Game with Two Types
Let some type k>1 be given. Recall that Lemma 4 de¯ned an equilibrium (^ ¾(N); ^ ¿(N))
of the complete information game where, with occasional randomizations, type 1 and
player 2 play out a ¯nite sequence of actions N times and then settle on an equilibrium.





(de¯ned in Lemma 7) is not greater than ^ a1 +² for all ±>± 0(²), and for all ±>¹ ±(²)t h a t
the equilibrium de¯ned in Lemma 5 has payo®s, (¹ ®1; ¹ ®2;:::; ¹ ®K; ¹ ¯), that satisfy ¹ ¯ ¸ ^ b+3²
and ¹ a1(3²) ¡ ²=2 ¸ ¹ ®1 > ¹ a1(3²) ¡ C².L e ta0
1 2 [a1(¶);¹ a1(3²) ¡ C²] be given (this interval
is non-empty by (iv) above); then by Lemma 4 with (a¤
1;b)=(¹ ®1; ¹ ¯); and by (iv), for all
± close to 1, there exists N and strategies which we denote as (^ ¾(k;N); ^ ¿(k;N)) which
constitute an equilibrium of ©1(±), in which type 1 gets a payo® within 1
32² of a0
1.A tt h i s




s=0 is played N times with occasional randomizations
by type 1 and ¯nally, if 1 has not deviated from the sequence at a point of randomization,
play settles on an equilibrium of ©1(±) where the players receive the payo®s (¹ ®1; ¹ ¯). By
Lemma 4, there is a probability of at least r, independent of ±, that type 1 ends up playing
the equilibrium with payo®s (¹ ®1; ¹ ¯).
Let p with 0 <p 1 < 1
4 and pk0 =0f o ra l lk0 6=1 ;k be given. We will now show
there exists a p0, satisfying p0
1 ¸ p1, p0
k · pk and p0
k0 =0f o ra l lk0 6=1 ;k,s u c ht h a t
the following strategies, or a slight modi¯cation explained below, are an equilibrium in
t h eg a m e¡ ( p0;±). Type k plays a pure strategy and type 1 either follows k's actions or
plays a revealing action ~ {at one of a number of points of randomization. In the modi¯ed
equilibrium, one of the points of randomization is replaced by both types playing ~ { with
probability one and following the same path thereafter.




s=0 N times and then plays out the strategy
(for k) in the equilibrium of ¡(p;±) with the payo®s (¹ ®1;:::;¹ ®K; ¹ ¯) given above. Deviations
35by player 2 from his equilibrium strategy are minmaxed.
Type 1 plays a strategy so that from player 2's perspective the combined actions of types
1a n dk over the ¯rst TN periods replicate the strategy ^ ¾(k;N), de¯ned above, and,
after TN periods of playing the sequence, type 1 settles down to play the equilibrium of
¡(p;±) given above. Thus, in periods where ^ ¾(k;N) requires player 1 to randomize, type
1 actually deviates from the sequence with probability more than 1 ¡ ^ u to compensate
for the fact that type k never deviates from the sequence. If r (where r>r )i st h e
total probability that player 1 does not deviate from this sequence, then after TN periods
player 2 has the prior (r¡(1¡p0
1))=r that player 1 is type 1. Provided we choose p0 such
that p1 =1¡(1¡p0
1)=r,o rp0
1 =1¡r(1¡p1), then playing the continuation equilibrium
is feasible. Deviations by player 2 from his equilibrium strategy are minmaxed.
Player 2 will play out the strategy ^ ¿(k;N) on the equilibrium path over the ¯rst TN
periods with the terminal equilibrium of ¡(p;±) given above being played thereafter,
or one of the revealing equilibria if type 1 has revealed her type. However, if player 1
uses a pure action that deviates from her equilibrium strategy (i.e., a probability zero
action), then player 2 responds in the following way. He ¯rst calculates type 1's expected
payo® if she were to continue playing out her strategy (and player 2 plays the actions
described above); call this c. Then he takes the convex combination ¸z +( 1¡ ¸)¹ a,o f
the point z (de¯ned in (30)) and the point ¹ a,t h a tg i v e st y p e1e x a c t l yt h ep a y o ®c,
that is, ¸ =( ¹ a1 ¡ c)=(¹ a1 ¡ ^ a1). By the construction above (point (iii) below (39)), since
c>^ a1 +¶¡²=2 then this convex combination is (2+(1+R)(2+Q))²-IR.8 That is, there
exists a vector of IR payo®s (!1;::::;!K) 2< K such that
(!1;:::;!K)+( 2 + ( 1 + R)(2 + Q))²1 · ¸z +( 1¡ ¸)¹ a
=
Ã
c;¹ a2 ¡ (¹ a1 ¡ c)
¹ a2 ¡ A2(¼2)
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼2)
;:::;¹ aK ¡ (¹ a1 ¡ c)
¹ aK ¡ AK(¼K)
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼K)
!
: (40)
Player 2 responds to a deviation of player 1 by holding each type k to a payo® of at most
!k + ², which is possible as ±>± ².
8At the equilibrium strategy for type 1 described above, type 1's payo® at the start of each ¯nite
sequence is a convex combination of ^ A1;k and the terminal equilibrium payo® ¹ ®1 :( 1¡±nT) ^ A1;k +±nT ¹ ®1,
for some integer n · N.T h ei n t e g e rn = N is chosen so that her equilibrium payo® (i.e., at the start of
the ¯rst round of the ¯nite sequence) is within ²=32 of a0
1 ¸ ^ a1 +¶; and hence at least ^ a1 +¶¡²=32: The
payo® ¹ ®1 is at least ¹ a1(3²)¡C² > ^ a1 +¶ (by the assumption on ²): Allowing for the small integer e®ects
which arise when playing out the ¯nite sequence of actions, it is thus the case that her continuation payo®
c at any point always exceeds ^ a1 + ¶ ¡ ²=16.
36To show that these strategies form an equilibrium of the game ¡(p0;±)w h i c hg i v e s
positive probability only to types f1;kg, it is su±cient to show that type 1 and type k
do not bene¯t by deviating from their equilibrium strategy by playing an action that is
assigned probability zero by their strategy.9 It will be convenient to let c (as above) and
d denote, respectively, type 1 and type k's equilibrium continuation payo®s at the start
of the period in which the observed deviation occurred. We will ¯rst show that type 1
does not bene¯t by deviating. By the construction above, if ±>± ² then type 1's expected
payo® from deviation is at most (1 ¡ ±)M + ±(!1 + ²), whereas her expected payo® from
continuing, c,s a t i s ¯ e sc>! 1 +3 ² from (40); our assumption on ± is su±cient to ensure
a deviation is suboptimal.
Next, we show that type k cannot pro¯tably deviate from these strategies. Type k
can make unobservable deviations from the equilibrium by playing the action type 1 uses
to reveal her type (by playing ~ { at a point of randomization), and then by continuing
to follow type 1's actions, playing out an equilibrium of the game ©1(±). It is possible
that such a deviation is pro¯table. A small re-working of the players' strategies gives a
\semi-pooling" equilibrium (either type 1 reveals her type or both types end up following
the same path) with the same payo® to type 1 and a greater payo® to type k,i ft h i si s
the case. Let t denote the ¯rst time at which this unobservable deviation is pro¯table for
type k. Rede¯ne the players' equilibrium strategies, so that before time t all players use
exactly the same actions and at time t both types play ~ { (the revealing action) and play
out the strategies of the equilibrium of the game ©1(±). (Player 2's strategy is exactly
the same as before.) This does not change type 1's equilibrium payo® because she was
indi®erent at ~ {.I t r a i s e s t y p e k's equilibrium payo®, because she prefers the deviation
to the original putative equilibrium. Player 2's payo®s remain individually rational at
each date because the continuation equilibrium after ~ { yields a higher payo® than the
payo® when ~ { is not played, and so 2's payo® increases. Finally, to verify that this is
an equilibrium we must show that type k will not bene¯t from making an observable
deviation at some later stage from the equilibrium of ©1(±) .W ew i l la d d r e s st h i si nt h e
parentheses after case (b) below.
9Lemma 4 guarantees that type 1 is indi®erent between the positive probability actions in periods
when she must randomize, and that player 2 is playing an optimal response to types 1 and k.
37Now, we consider observable deviations by k from the equilibrium, which result in
player 2 punishing player 1, assuming for the moment that the equilibrium is not the
semi-pooling type just described. By (40) there exists a vector of punishment payo®s !
such that
!k +( 2+( 1+R)(2 + Q))²
· ¹ ak ¡ (¹ a1 ¡ c)
¹ ak ¡ Ak(¼k)
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k)
= f(1 ¡ ±
TN0
) ^ Akk + ±
TN0
¹ ®k ¡ dg + ±
TN0
f¹ ak ¡ ¹ ®kg +( 1¡ ±
TN0
)fAk(¼k) ¡ ^ Akkg
+
¹ ak ¡ Ak(¼k)




)[ ^ A1k ¡ A1(¼k)] + [c ¡ (1 ¡ ±
TN0





[¹ a1 ¡ ¹ ®1]
o
+ d
<d+ f(1 ¡ ±
TN0
) ^ Akk + ±
TN0
¹ ®k ¡ dg + Q² + ²=2
+
¹ ak ¡ Ak(¼k)
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k)
n
²=2 ¡ (1 ¡ ±
TN0
) ^ A1k ¡ ±
TN0
¹ ®1 + c + Q²
o
: (41)
The ¯nal inequality follows from (35), Ak(¼k) ¡ ^ Akk <² = 2a n d ^ A1k ¡ A1(¼k) <² = 2
(which follows from Lemma 7). Thus if player 2 assesses type 1's continuation payo®,
c, to be close to what she would receive from N0 iterations of the ¯nite sequence and
if d is close to what type k gets from N0 iterations of the ¯nite sequence then type
k prefers d to its punishment payo®. Type 1's continuation payo®, c, is determined
either by (a) continued playing out of the sequence f(^ {s
k;^ |s
k)g followed by the terminal
equilibrium (in this case type k's deviation is detected immediately), or by (b) her payo®
from continued playing out of the revealing equilibrium (relevant when type k made an
undetected deviation by playing ~ { and then later made an observable deviation). Let us
deal ¯rst with a deviation by type k in case (a). If type 1 has N0 complete repetitions
of the sequence left to perform, then, analogously with the derivation of (18), type 1's
payo® c satis¯es j(1 ¡ ±TN0) ^ A1k + ±TN0¹ ®1 ¡ cj· ²
16 and type k's continuation payo®, d,
satis¯es j(1 ¡ ±TN0) ^ Akk + ±TN0¹ ®k ¡ dj· ²
16. These inequalities, and (36), substituted in
(41), imply that !k+(3+R)²<d ; thus a deviation for type k is not pro¯table in this case
(by the assumption on ±). Now let us consider case (b). Assume the observed deviation
occurred t periods after ~ { was played at ¿, so an equilibrium of ©1(±) has been played for
the last t periods. Let the sequence f(is;js)g1
s=0 have as an initial point the move (~ {;^ |0)
and then include the sequence of actions played by the two players at this equilibrium.
Let !0
k =( 1¡±)ak +±!k denote k's payo® in the period she deviates and the subsequent




































Let d0 denote type k's continuation payo® from abiding by her equilibrium strategy, and
not playing ~ {.( T h u sd0 denotes type k's continuation payo® at ¿; the time the unobserved
deviation occurred, at the start of the revealing equilibrium.) The unobservable followed






























By assumption, k does not want to pool on the revealing equilibrium, so the ¯rst term on
the RHS is non-positive. The ¯nal term on the RHS is less that 9
16², because the strategies
^ ¾(k;N), as de¯ned above Lemma 4, used Result 2 to ensure that play after~ { gives all types
within ²=2o ft h e i rc o n t i n u a t i o np a y o ®a t~ { at all future times and the playing of ~ { can
change the payo® by at most 1
16². Thus, this condition can only be true if d0 <! 0
k+ 9
16²,o r
d0 <! k + 10
16² because of the assumption on ±. The punishment payo®, !k, is determined
by (40) and c (the continuation payo® to type 1 at the point of the observed deviation
by type k) Replacing d by d0 in (41), letting N0 be the number of plays of the sequence
left at ¿ (d and N0 are arbitrary in (41)), noting that c is within ²=2o ft h ec o n t i n u a t i o n
payo® at ¿ to type 1, say c0, and as above j(1 ¡ ±TN0) ^ A1k + ±TN0¹ ®1 ¡ c0j· ²
16 and also
j(1 ¡ ±TN0
) ^ Akk + ±TN0
¹ ®k ¡ d0j· ²
16, we can deduce from (41) that !k +( 3+15
16R)²<d 0.
This is a contradiction as d0 <! k +(10=16)². [In the semi-pooling equilibrium, described
in the previous paragraph, type k and type 1 both play out an equilibrium of ©1(±). Type
k bene¯ts by a subsequent observable deviation if her payo® from continued play of the
equilibrium, d0 ´ (1 ¡ ±)
P1
s=0 ±sAk(is;js)( w h e r ed0 is again k's payo® from sticking to
her equilibrium strategy, computed at the start of the revealing equilibrium, but now k's
strategy speci¯es that~ { is played), is less than what she receives by deviation t periodsafter
~ { was played: (1 ¡ ±)
Pt¡1
s=0 ±sAk(is;js)+±t!0
k.T h i si m p l i e s!0




k =( 1¡ ±)ak + ±!k a n dR e s u l t2 ,w eh a v ea g a i n!k + 1
16²>d 0 ¡ 9
16². However,
39noting that in a semi-pooling equilibrium d0 satis¯es d0 ¸ (1¡±TN0) ^ Akk+±TN0¹ ®k¡ ²
16 (where
N0 again denotes the number of plays of the sequence left at the start of the revealing
equilibrium), and c as in the above argument satis¯es j(1 ¡ ±TN0) ^ A1k +±TN0¹ ®1 ¡ cj·9²
16,
so (41) again implies !k +( 3+15
16R)²<d 0, a contradiction.]
The strategies above are an equilibrium, so, given any ±>± ¶, a0
1 2 [a1(¶);¹ a1(3²)¡C²]
and terminal priors p satisfying 0 <p 1 < 1
4 and pk0 = 0 for all k0 62 f1;kg, there exists p0
(with p0
1 =1¡r(1¡p1)) and an equilibrium of the game ¡(p0;±) with the payo®s (~ ®1; ~ ¯)
w h e r et y p e1 ' sp a y o ® ,~ ®1,s a t i s ¯ e sj~ ®1 ¡ a0
1j < 1
32². We use this result to show that there
exists an r0 > 0 such that if ±>± ¶, p00
1 > 1 ¡ r0 and p00
k0 = 0 for all k0 62 f1;kg,t h e n
for any pair (a1;b) 2 G1(¶)w i t ha1 < ¹ a1(3²) ¡ C²; ¡(p00;±) has an equilibrium with the
payo®s (®¤
1;¯¤)t h a ts a t i s f yk(®¤
1;¯¤) ¡ (a1;b)k <² . To do this it is necessary to alter
the period zero strategies of the equilibrium described above. Now type 1 randomizes
in period zero | with probability 1 ¡ ¹ she plays out the equilibrium just described
where a0
1 is set equal to a1, and with probability ¹ she reveals her type by playing ~ { 6=^ {0,
and play then follows an equilibrium of the complete information game in which ¯rst-
period actions are (~ {;^ |0). As in the above argument, we can choose the equilibrium in
the complete information game so that type 1 is indi®erent between the two ¯rst-period
actions ~ { and ^ {0.L e t( ~ a1;~ b) 2 G1(²) denote the payo®s, discounted to period 0, type 1 and
player 2 receive conditional on ~ { being played in the ¯rst period. As type 1 randomizes
in the ¯rst period ~ a1 =~ ®1,s o~ a1 is within 1
32² of a1 and we can therefore also choose ~ b
to be within 1
32² of b (since (a1;b) 2 G1(¶)a n d²<¶ ). The arguments above imply that
this will also be an equilibrium for ±>± ¶, provided player 2 has the priors p0 after ^ {0 is
observed in the ¯rst period. Type 1 and player 2's expected payo®s from these strategies
are (®¤
1;¯¤)=(~ ®1;p 00
1¹~ b +( 1¡ p00
1¹)~ ¯), so
j¯
¤ ¡ bj = jp
00
1¹~ b +( 1¡ p
00
1¹)~ ¯ ¡~ b +~ b ¡ bj
·j ~ ¯ ¡~ bj(1 ¡ p
00






If ¹ c a nb ec h o s e nt os a t i s f y¹ ¸ (1 ¡²=(6M))=p00
1, we can ensure that ¯¤ is within ²=2o f
b.I f ^ {0 is observed in the ¯rst period player 2's posterior for type k is (1¡p00
1)=(1¡¹p00
1), so




As 1 ¡ p0
1 = r(1 ¡ p1)( w h e r er is the probability that player 1 does not deviate from
the ¯xed sequence in the equilibrium above) we can re-write this condition as 1 ¡ p00
1 =
40r(1¡p1)(1¡¹p00
1). For any p00 and ¹ 2 [0;1] that satisfy ¹ ¸ [1¡²=(6M)]=p00
1 and 1¡p00
1 =
r(1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ ¹p00
1), we have found an equilibrium where type 1 and player 2 get payo®s
close to (a1;b). Given a p00
1; av a l u ef o r¹>0 can be found to satisfy these two conditions
provided 1 ¡ p00
1 <r (1 ¡ p1)²=6M.W ec h o s ep1 < 1
4 and by Lemma 4, r>r ,w h e r er > 0
is independent of ± and a1, so a su±cient condition for this is 1¡p00
1 <r 3
4²=6M.P r o v i d e d
p00
1 > 1¡r0 where r0 := r3
4²=6M we have found an equilibrium of ¡(p00;±) with the desired
properties. (If type k prefers to mimic the revelation action of type 1 at date 0; then the
strategies can be amended as in the semi-pooling equilibrium to re-establish equilibrium.)
We have now shown that when K =2a n d( a1;b) 2 G1(¶)\f(x;y)jx<¹ a1(3²)¡C²¡²g the
game has an equilibrium and payo®s that satisfy k(®1;¯) ¡ (a1;b)k <¶ . (The condition
a1 < ¹ a1(3²)¡C²¡² ensures there is at least one randomization by player 1.) By choosing
¶<minfº=2;¹ ²=2g su±ciently small then proves the theorem when K =2 :
2 . T h eg a m ew i t hm a n yt y p e sK>2
We now describe the players' strategies in the repeated game of incomplete information
¡(p;±) where all types are given positive probability, and show that these strategies are an
equilibrium with payo®s satisfying (14). The play in the game is divided into a signalling
phase, where all types are given positive probability, and a payo® phase where only two
types of player 1 are given positive probability.
Periods t=0,1,...,K-3 : The Signalling Phase: The players use the following
strategies: Type k,w h e r ek =2 ;3;:::;K¡1, plays action it =1i np e r i o d st =0 ;1;:::;k¡3
a n di np e r i o dt = k ¡ 2s h ep l a y sa c t i o ni = 2 to signal her type. Type K plays action
it =1i np e r i o d st =0 ;1;:::;K¡ 3. The signalling phase ends the ¯rst time it =2o r
in period K ¡ 1 whichever happens the sooner. Type 1 chooses a type k =2 ;3;:::;K
with probability Ák and sends the signal appropriate for that type. (All of the types of
player 1 minmax player 2 if she chooses a pure action that is not played with positive
probability in the signalling phase.) Player 2 plays action j = 1 with probability q0 and
action j = 2 with probability 1¡q0 in period zero. If, in period t<K¡2, player 1 used
action i = 1 in all past periods, then player 2 plays action j = 1 with probability qt(^ ht¡1)
and action j = 2 with probability 1¡qt(^ ht¡1), where ^ ht¡1 is the history of player 2's past
actions up to t ¡ 1. (If player 2 observes a deviation in period t · K ¡ 3t h e nh ep l a y s
41the punishments described above for the 2-type game with the types f1;t+2 g.)
After the signalling: At the end of the signalling phase, that is, as soon as type k
is identi¯ed, only two types of player 1, f1;kg, will be given positive probability by player
2. The players then play an equilibrium described in part 1 of the proof; however, the
equilibrium they play will depend on the entire sequence of actions player 2 plays during
the signalling phase.
We will begin by considering the case where IntG1(0) 6= ;.L e t( a1;b)b eap o i n ti n
G1(¶) that satis¯es the condition U[(a1;b);¶;¶] ½ G1(¶) \f (x;y)jx<¹ a1(3²) ¡ C²g (¶ will
be chosen su±ciently small to ensure this is possible). Here we introduce notation for the
open rectangle centered at the point (x;y) with width W and height H,t h a ti s ,
U[(x;y);W;H]: =f (x1;y 1) 2<
2 jj x ¡ x1j < 0:5W; jy ¡ y1j < 0:5H g:
We will show how the continuation equilibria after the signalling can be chosen to give
the players incentives to randomize. We will also show that after the signalling phase
player 2's posterior beliefs will still attach positive probability to type 1, and as p1 ! 1
these posteriors give arbitrarily high probability to type 1. Thus, it is possible to choose
p1 su±ciently high for the equilibrium (described above) of the game with two types to
be played after the signalling phase. We also show that the signalling strategies give the
players payo®s close to (a1;b).
Let (®
k;j
1 ;¯k;j) denote the continuation equilibrium payo®s to type 1 and player 2
when player 1 signals type k and player 2 plays action j in the period the signal was sent.
We will start in the ¯nal signalling period t = K ¡ 3. We will choose the continuation




















y + ²);²;Y ²]; (43)
where (a
y
1;b y) is chosen so that U[(a
y
1;b y);3²;3Y² ] ½ U[(a1;b);¶;¶]. (Recall that Y =1
when IntG1(0) 6= ;, as assumed for the moment; however it will be convenient to retain
the general notation for the case when IntG1(0) = ;.) It is possible to choose such
continuation equilibria, because the sets on the right of (42) and (43) are in IntG1(¶) \
f(x;y)jx<¹ a1(3²)¡C²g and part 1 of the proof, therefore, applies. Continuation equilibria
42satisfying (42) and (43) can be found, because (by (18) and part 1) type 1's payo® can be
approximated to within ²=16 and by player 2's payo® can be approximated to within ²=2.
Given this choice of continuation equilibria in period K ¡ 3 we will show that players'
expected payo®s at the start of period K ¡3 (potential continuation equilibria for period
K ¡ 4) lie in the set U[(a
y
1;b y);²½;Y ²½], where ½ =1+1
8. This will furnish an inductive
step. In period K ¡3 type 1 randomizes between i =1a n di = 2. Her payo®s from these
actions are:
















(A1(i;qK¡3) is an abuse that denotes type 1's stage-game payo® from action i when player
















Let (¹;1¡¹) denote the probability player 1 plays i =1a n di =2i np e r i o dK ¡3g i v e n
the observed history. If we abuse our notation in a similar fashion as before, player 2 is
indi®erent between action j =1a n dj =2w h e n
1 ¡ ±
±





We can ¯nd qK¡3 2 [0;1] and ¹ 2 [0;1] to make both players indi®erent. First, the
LHS of (44) is less than ²=16 (by our assumption on ±) and the LHS of (45) is less than
Y²1
16 in absolute value (2M is the maximum variation in player 1's payo®s so 2YMis the
maximum variation in player 2's). The assumption on the continuation equilibria implies
that the RHS of (44) [respectively (45)] is a linear function of qK¡3 [respectively ¹]t h a t
includes in its range ¡² [respectively ¡Y² ]t o² [respectively Y² ]. Thus there exist qK¡3
and ¹ that solve (44) and (45). There are upper and lower bounds on the value of ¹ for
w h i c h( 4 5 )h o l d s .A st h eL H Si sl e s st h a nY²1
16, the ¯rst square bracket on the RHS is





Also, by taking the minimal and maximal continuation payo®s we can show that type





43The paragraph above describes potential continuation equilibria after period K ¡ 4
of the signalling phase (assuming type K¡2 is not signalled). We will use this to describe
an equilibrium for period K ¡ 4 onward with payo®s in U[(a
y




y);(2 + ½ + ½
2)²;S(2 + ½ + ½
2)²] ½ U[(a1;b);¶;¶]: (46)
To build this equilibrium it is ¯rst necessary to describe behaviour in period K ¡ 3.
Repeat the argument of the previous paragraph with the sets in (42) and (43) replaced
by U[(a
y
1;b y) ¡ (²½;Y ²½) § (²;Y ²);²;Y ²], to ¯nd a period K ¡ 3 equilibrium with payo®s
in U[(a
y
1;b y) ¡ (²½;Y ²½);²½;Y ²½] ((46) is su±cient for this to be possible). This is the
equilibrium played if (i;j)=( 1 ;1) in period K ¡ 4. A similar procedure can be followed
to ¯nd a period K¡3 equilibrium with payo®s in U[(a
y
1;b y)+(²½;Y ²½);²½;Y ²½] and again
(46) is su±cient; this is played if (i;j)=( 1 ;2) in period K ¡ 4. If player 1 plays i =2i n
period K¡4 we can use the argument in part 1 and (46) to ¯nd two continuation equilibria
of the game with the types f1;K¡ 2g with payo®s in U[(a
y
1;b y) ¡ (²½;Y ²½);²½;Y ²½]a n d
U[(a
y
1;b y)+( ²½;Y ²½);²½;Y ²½], which are played when (i;j) equals respectively (2;2) or
(2;1) in period K¡4. Now consider the randomizations in period K¡4. We can apply the





64] and that type 1's and player 2's period K¡4 expected equilibrium
payo®s are in U[(a
y
1;b y);²½2;Y²½ 2]. ( It is necessary to replace ² by ²½.)
Now we can iterate this argument working backwards to the ¯rst round of signalling
at time zero | all the time getting bounds on player 1's randomization. When there are
K¡2 periods of signalling it is necessary to be able to ¯nd equilibria in period K¡3 that lie
in the sets U[(a
y
1;b y)§(1+½+:::+½K¡3)(²;Y ²);²;Y ²]. This is possible if (a1;b)=( a
y
1;b y),
(v) holds (see beginning of proof) and U[(a1;b);¶;¶] ½ G1(¶) \f (x;y)jx<¹ a1(3²) ¡ C²g.
The construction of the signalling phase ensures period zero's expected payo®s are in the
interval U[(a1;b);²½K¡2;Y²½ K¡2] ½ U[(a1;b);¶;¶].
When IntG1(0) = ; the above argument will work virtually unchanged, because of
the inclusion of Y . However, it is necessary to replace the open rectangles U[(a1;b);x;Y x]
w i t ht h eo p e nl i n es e g m e n tb e t w e e nt h ep o i n t s( a1;b)§0:5(x;Y x) (this is the diagonal of
the rectangle above). By the de¯nition of Y , this lies in the feasible set and replaces the
open rectangles as a measure of a neighbourhood in the one dimensional set.
44The construction gives type 1 and player 2 period-zero expected payo®s in the set
U[(a1;b);¶;¶]. We must check that in all the continuation equilibria p1 is su±ciently large.
Given the lower bounds on player 1's probabilities derived above, each possible history of
player 1's signalling-phase actions occurs with at least probability (1
4 ¡ 1
64)K¡1 (from the
bound on ¹ above). Provided pk <r 0(1
4 ¡ 1
64)K¡1 we have p00
1 ¸ 1¡r0 and it is possible to
apply part 1 of the proof and play continuation equilibria satisfying (42) and (43). The
required lower bound on p1 is thus 1 ¡ r0(1
4 ¡ 1




We now show that no player wishes to deviate from their equilibrium strategies in the
equilibrium with many types. As argued, under the assumption on ± and (a1;b)p l a y e r2 ' s
continuation payo® is within ¶ of b during the entire signalling phase and hence greater
than ^ b+¶, whereas a deviation yields at most ^ b+²=2, which by ²<¶ = 2 is thus unpro¯table.
Thereafter, whichever types are signalled player 2 does not bene¯t from deviating by
Lemma 4. A similar argument coupled with part 1 of this proof ensures that type 1
does not bene¯t by deviating from the strategies described above and neither does type k
bene¯t by deviating when she has signalled that she is type k, because the losses during the
signalling phase are su±ciently small. The four possible extra deviations that can arise
when there are many types are: type k mimics type k0 (unobservable), type k mimics
type k0 and then deviates to take a punishment (unobservable then observable), type k
mimics type k0 and later she plays ~ { and then mimics type 1 at a revealing equilibrium
(unobservable), or type k mimics type k0,l a t e rs h ep l a y s~ { a n dt h e nm i m i c st y p e1b e f o r e
¯nally deviating from the revealing equilibrium to take a punishment (unobservable then
observable). We will begin by showing that these deviations are not pro¯table when
the strategy of type k0 is to play the original strategy described and then treat the case
described in part 1 when the semi-pooling strategies are followed. Suppose type k sends
the signal of type k0 and then plays out her ¯nite sequence N0 times before settling at
the equilibrium described in Lemma 5. From (34) her payo® from this, discounted to
the period after the signalling is ¯nished, is (1 ¡ ±TN0) ^ Ak;k0 + ±TN0¹ ®k, whereas her payo®
from playing her equilibrium strategy can be written as (1 ¡ ±TN) ^ Ak;k + ±TN¹ ®k.A t a n
equilibrium, type 1 will follow the action sequences of type k and type k0 with positive
probability. Let c be type 1's expected equilibrium payo® from type k's sequence and c0
45be her expected payo® from type k0's sequence, that is,
c =( 1 ¡ ±
TN) ^ A1;k + ±
TN¹ ®1 =( 1¡ ±
TN)( ^ A1;k ¡ ¹ ®1)+¹ ®1; (47)
c
0 =( 1 ¡ ±
TN0
) ^ A1;k0 + ±
TN0
¹ ®1 =( 1¡ ±
TN0
)( ^ A1;k0 ¡ ¹ ®1)+¹ ®1: (48)
The following will be a su±cient condition to rule out the ¯rst form of deviation described
above (since the signalling phase contributes at most ²2=2 to payo®s by our choice of ±):
(1 ¡ ±
TN) ^ Ak;k + ±
TN¹ ®k > (1 ¡ ±
TN0
) ^ Ak;k0 + ±
TN0




TN)( ^ Ak;k ¡ ¹ ®k) > (1 ¡ ±
TN0
)( ^ Ak;k0 ¡ ¹ ®k)+²
2;
or
^ Ak;k ¡ ¹ ®k
¹ ®1 ¡ ^ A1;k
¡
^ Ak;k0 ¡ ¹ ®k
¹ ®1 ¡ ^ A1;k0
>
^ Ak;k ¡ ¹ ®k
¹ ®1 ¡ ^ A1;k
c ¡ c0
¹ ®1 ¡ c0 +
²2
¹ ®1 ¡ c0; (49)
where the last inequality follows from substitution for (1¡±TN) from (47) and for (1¡±TN0
)
from (48). By (39) the LHS above is greater than (2 + R)²,s oi ti ss u ± c i e n tt os h o w
that the RHS is less than this. Type 1 randomizes between mimicking type k and type
k0 in equilibrium. The signalling phase payo® plus c and the signalling phase payo® plus
c0 give type 1 identical payo®s. The signalling phase payo®s contribute at most 1
2²2,s o
jc ¡ c0j <² 2.A l s oc0 < ¹ a1(3²) ¡ C²¡ ² so that there is at least one iteration of the ¯nite
sequence and ¹ ®1 > ¹ a1(3²) ¡ C² so ¹ ®1 ¡ c0 (the denominator of the last term) is strictly
bigger than ². The last term is, therefore, strictly less than ². Similarly (39) implies
the ¯rst term on the RHS is less than (R +1 ) ²: So (49) holds and it is optimal for type
k to play her equilibrium strategy. We can now consider the second form of deviation.
Suppose that type k mimics type k0 and then deviates (before N0 iterations are played)
when type 1's continuation payo® is c. The strategies described in part 1 of the proof
impose the same punishment on type k as the punishment she would have received if she
had truthfully signalled her type and then deviated when type 1's continuation payo®
was c (she can get the same deviation payo® by signalling truthfully). A repetition of the
above argument shows that this latter option is strictly preferred to the former, and hence
a fortiori type k prefers to use her equilibrium strategy. If the third type of deviation
gives type k more than her equilibrium payo® a small emendation of the above strategies
46restores an equilibrium. To do this replace type k's strategy with her mimicking player
k0 a n dt h e np l a y i n g~ { in this way and remove the stage of the signalling phase where
type k is signalled. This increases player 2's payo® when k0 is signalled so her payo®s
remain individually rational throughout. (If there are more than two types for which this
deviation is pro¯table, each type can likewise play the signal which she prefers). If the
fourth type of deviation is optimal then type k must bene¯t from an observable deviation
from the equilibrium of the complete information game after ~ { w a ss i g n a l l e d .I nt h i sc a s e
the argument in parentheses dealing with the semi-pooling equilibrium applies mutatis
mutandis.
Now we must deal with the amended strategies and consider what occurs if type k0
at some point plays a semi-pooling equilibrium with type 1, rather than continuing to
reveal her type. If type k0 and type 1 play the semi-pooling equilibrium, then the possible
deviations available to type k mimicking type k0 or type 1 were available to her above
also. Thus the argument above applies to this case also.
Now we return to the condition (38), that has been assumed to hold. This condition
guaranteed that the types k>1 strictly preferred to play the iterations of their ¯nite
sequence, f(^ {s
k;^ |s
k)g, rather than another type's sequence, before settling on the terminal
equilibrium. (This condition will fail if, for example, the payo®s of type k are a linear
transformation of the payo®s of type k0 and so ¼k = ¼k0.) Suppose, now, that there exist
k and k0 so that
Ak(¼k) ¡ ¹ ak
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k)
=
Ak(¼k0) ¡ ¹ ak
¹ a1 ¡ A1(¼k0)
: (50)
In this case we can choose ¼k = ¼k0 and the sequence f(^ {s
k;^ |s
k)g to be the same as f(^ {s
k0;^ |s
k0)g.
A small change to the above strategies restores an equilibrium. Change type k's equilib-
rium strategy so that she plays exactly the same actions as type k0 until the ¯nal playing
of the equilibrium described in Lemma 5, that is, so that both k and k0 signal at the same
time (and in the same way) and so that the period in the signalling phase where type k
was signalled is removed. Note that conditions (a)-(c) of Lemma 6 still apply when ¼k is
replaced by ¼k0 (s i n c e¼k0 must also solve (31)), so the previous argument can be repeated
mutatis mutandis. Any remaining indi®erences can be handled in exactly the same way.
Let R(¶)d e n o t et h es e to fp o i n t s( a1;b) in the relative interior of G1(¶)\f (x;y)jx<
¹ a1(3²)¡C²¡²g that are at a distance at least ¶ from the boundary of the relative interior
47of G1(¶) \f (x;y)jx<¹ a1(3²) ¡ C²¡ ²g. W eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h e r ee x i s t sa±¶ < 1a n d
p¶
1 < 1 such that for all p with p1 >p ¶
1 and ±>± ¶,g i v e na n y( a1;b) 2 R(¶) the game
¡(p;±) has an equilibrium with payo®s that satisfy k(®1;¯) ¡ (a1;b)k <¶ :By choosing
¶<º = 3 and su±ciently small the Theorem follows. Q.E.D.
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